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ABSTRACT
Explaining North Korean Nuclear Strategy Under Kim 
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Seoul National University 
Policy-makers and political scientists agree that North Korea intends to become a nuclear 
weapons power, but there is a lack of consensus on how North Korea intends to make this 
goal a reality. For the past few decades, North Korea has often slowed down or sped up its 
pursuit of nuclear weapons in unexpected and seemingly irrational ways. Explaining North 
Korea’s varying nuclear strategy has become even more pertinent under the rule of Kim 
Jong-Un, whose country grows closer to intercontinental and second-strike nuclear 
capabilities every day. In attempt to evaluate some of the theoretical approaches to this 
research topic, this study examines and compares the explanatory power of two theoretical 
models as applied to North Korean nuclear strategy: a coercive bargaining model created 
by Victor Cha and a “madman” model created by Avidit Acharya and Edoardo Grillo. The 
coercive bargaining model, based on power transition theory and prospect theory,
rationalizes North Korea’s acceptance of risky nuclear strategy choices through its 
ii
perception of its own position in the international system. The “madman” model, based on 
two-sided incomplete information game theory, extols the logic of North Korea “acting 
crazy” to illicit greater strategic outcomes for itself. A congruence test is used to see 
whether the predictions of the models co-vary with North Korean transitions in nuclear 
strategy from fast to slow, or vice versa, from the years 2011 to 2017. 
Keywords: Nuclear strategy, International Security, International Relations, North Korea, 
United States
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Introduction:
North Korea’s goal to become a nuclear state has been a critically important issue 
both practically and theoretically for decades. The threat of North Korea possessing 
operational nuclear weapons endangers millions of lives, and the state’s decisions
regarding those weapons have enormous security implications for the Northeast Asian
region and beyond. In recent years, the stakes have not changed substantially since Kim 
Jong-Un became the state’s leader, but rather intensified as North Korea has advanced its 
nuclear weapons capabilities and aggravated its relations with other regional actors.
Policymakers, national intelligence, and scholars alike have a vested interest in explaining 
why and how North Korea is trying to achieve its nuclear ambitions. The why question is 
both important and considerably challenging to study; North Korea is a famously opaque 
nation that is renowned for blocking quality information on its activities. Although 
numerous studies have explored the topic with diffusive results, a general consensus seems 
to have formed in the formal literature: whether for deterrence purposes, regime survival, 
the personal pride of its leaders or other reasons, North Korea has shown a consistent 
preference to go nuclear. Scholars using various methodological approaches and 
theoretical assumptions agree: North Korea wants the bomb (Cha and Kang, 2003; He and 
Feng; 2013; Hymans, 2008). Perhaps more perplexing is the how question, or what actual 
strategy North Korea has employed to reach its goal to go nuclear over the years. North 
Korea has been described as having “two faces”, varying between cooperative and 
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rebellious stances on its nuclear program, and is notorious for its bizarre and seemingly 
irrational behavior typified by aggressive nuclear-related tests or threats that could provoke 
outside intervention and the entrance into and eventual abandonment of denuclearization 
agreements with key rival states (Cha and Kang, 2003). This variance has also presented a 
significant challenge to the predominant IR theories while simultaneously creating an 
opportunity for alternative theories. Neorealist and neoliberal institutional theoretical 
explanations that rely on traditional rational actor model assumptions have had difficulty 
explaining North Korea’s acute changes in nuclear behavior; if North Korea wants the 
bomb, then why has it stopped a full pursuit of nuclear proficiency and signaled a 
willingness on multiple occasions to negotiate and denuclearize? In other words, why does 
North Korea’s nuclear strategy vary? Subsequent research focusing on small adjustments 
to rational actor assumptions and decision-making under conditions of risk has provided
innovative and convincing analysis (Cha and Kang, 2003; He and Feng, 2013). This paper 
seeks to continue in this line of research, applying and testing three theoretical models in a 
more contemporary context to explain perplexing and varying nuclear behaviors by
treating them as components of North Korea’s overall nuclear strategy to obtain nuclear 
weapons proficiency. Thus, this paper is a study of nuclear strategy, using a security 
studies’ definition of strategy where intelligence, diplomacy, and military strength are used 
to determine outcomes by a state and narrowed to an analytical focus on activity related to 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program (Luttwak, 2009). The study includes the 
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application of Victor Cha’s (2003) coercive bargaining model and Avidit Acharya and 
Edoardo Grillo’s (2015) “madman” model to the case of North Korean nuclear strategy
from 2011-2017, capturing both the variance in strategy we seek to explain and the years 
of Kim Jong-Un’s rise to power and subsequent role as the country’s supreme leader. The 
results will hopefully provide distinct answers to the how question discussed above, and 
will allow us to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of these theoretical models’ ability 
to explain North Korea’s nuclear strategy under the current Kim Jong-Un regime.
The models were selected for their distinct independent variables explaining North 
Korea’s varying nuclear strategy and their ability to produce testable hypothesis, and to 
use their results to compare and evaluate each model’s explanatory powers. The first two 
models, the coercive bargaining model and the political legitimacy-prospect model, have 
been applied to North Korea before and their application to a contemporary set of cases 
can help evaluate their utility as the theories have aged. The coercive bargaining model, as 
formulated by Victor Cha, uses a combination of power transition theory and prospect 
theory to explain that North Korea chooses its nuclear strategy based on its risky position 
as a weak, revisionist state surrounded by stronger, rival states (2003).  North Korea uses 
its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and accepts the subsequent risks of doing so, as a 
bargaining tool to coerce its rival states into revising the status quo that they would 
otherwise be unable to affect, which explains the “two faces” of North Korean nuclear 
strategy. Alternatively, the “madman” model is a game theoretic model of war and peace 
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that expounds the dynamics and benefits of using a “madman” strategy, or acting as if one 
is crazy to force another country to agree to terms in bargaining that a rational state would 
be unable to achieve (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). In other words, this model extolls the 
costs and benefits of “acting crazy” to get your opponent to give in to exorbitant demands, 
and in the North Korean context explains the how Kim Jong-Un could be using the 
“madman” strategy when making its nuclear decisions.
It is important to note that this paper does not intend to make a definitive claim on 
the explanatory power of the models or the theories that they are based on in general, but 
merely to compare their explanatory power for this case study. Much of the scholarly work 
on North Korea to date acknowledges the possibility of overly deterministic theorizing for 
a notoriously convoluted case, so the same logic should be applied here in that the findings 
of the study should only be seen as a preliminary attempt to explain North Korean nuclear 
strategy and to expand research possibilities in the IR field. As such, this paper will use a 
congruence test as the basis for testing the models, or observing whether North Korea’s 
nuclear strategy is actually congruent with the predictions of the models. This means the 
findings do not indicate causality and leaves open the possibility that other variables are 
responsible for producing North Korean nuclear strategy in the case study, but as He and 
Feng (2013) explain, it is extremely difficult to access the kind of information on North 
Korea required to rule out alternative explanations and provide enough evidence for 
acceptable certainty of findings.
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This paper will follow the following structure: the first section provides a basic 
literature review of scholarly work relevant to the research questions of how state’s pursue 
their nuclear goals and what factors impact nuclear strategy. This section will also briefly 
summarize how these theoretical developments have manifested in studies of North Korea 
and its nuclear strategy. The second section introduces the research design, describing the 
case parameters and reasons for its selection along with the details and justification of the 
dependent variable. This section uses a framework to operationalize the dependent variable 
that the models will try to explain in the rest of the paper. The fourth and fifth sections will 
explain the theoretical background and assumptions of the respective models, list their 
hypotheses and apply them to the case study, and provide an analysis. The paper’s final
section will present a conclusion on the study’s contributions, limitations, and implications 
for future research.
Literature Review:
The main question this section is concerned with is the following: how do states 
formulate their nuclear strategies? A review of the formal literature offers a bounty of 
answers, and for the sake of brevity this literature review will be broken up into three
subsections: defining strategy, which will explore the development of the term as it is used 
in social science; structural theories of IR, which will detail the predominant theoretical 
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premises for both why and how states purse nuclear weapons; and alternative theories on
North Korean nuclear strategy, which will detail how certain research has developed or
deviated from the previously accepted premises in significant ways to study North Korean 
nuclear strategy. In sum these subsections will provide a necessary overview of the 
theoretical field relevant to the research question and some significant research on North 
Korean nuclear strategy to date.
Defining Strategy
This paper is a study of nuclear strategy, but what exactly does nuclear strategy 
mean? The exact definition of the concept used in this study will be covered later, but 
firstly, it is worth briefly noting the historical development of the concept of “strategy” as 
a subject of research by social scientists. This will help to frame the discussion of the 
formal literature and the various theories that answer the questions of why and how states 
go nuclear.
Carl von Clausewitz and his book On War have been extremely influential in the 
development and study of the concept of strategy (Hart, 1967). In his book, Clausewitz 
discusses strategy within the context of war, as he was most concerned with studying the 
nature of war and how it was conducted (Von Clausewitz, 1832; Hart, 1967). The art of 
war, according to Clausewitz, was achieving a political goal through military conflict with 
another country and this attainment of the political goal of war could be achieved through 
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the combination of two different levels of war: strategy, which entailed the use of battles; 
and tactics, which was the art of winning battles (Von Clausewitz, 1832). Thus, strategy is 
often associated with wartime and security studies, higher stratification of using military 
force compared to tactics, and the use of military force as a means to an objective end 
(Hart, 1967).
B. H. Liddell Hart is also considered a key contributor to developing the term 
strategy in security studies literature, juxtaposing his own thoughts on the concept with 
Clausewitz directly. While Hart maintains the same analytical focus as Clausewitz on war 
and its nature, he differs significantly in his definition of strategy and what the term 
applies to. In his book Strategy, Hart claims that Clausewitz’s definition centered on 
battles unnecessarily ties the end of war, or the achievement of a political goal, with 
fighting the enemy (1967). On the contrary, Hart argues that strategy can be expanded to 
include how military decisions are made to avoid the costs of war as much as possible, and 
generals or military leaders use their military force to achieve the goals of war as 
efficiently as possible. His subsequent definition of strategy, “the art of distributing and 
applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy”, reflects his attempts to broaden the 
concept to more accurately encompass military-related decisions made during war (Hart, 
1967). Hart also made a lasting contribution to the field with his introduction of the 
concept of grand strategy, which broadens the resources considered under strategy beyond 
the military. Grand strategy, or “policy which guides the conduct of war”, covers a 
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government’s entire approach to fulfilling the policy goals of war, including economic and 
diplomatic resources that can be employed for these ends (Hart, 1967). This concept 
further stratified the levels at which a government can bring about its policy objectives 
during war. Grand strategy and its manifestations has become commonplace in security 
studies in attempting to paint a full picture of a government’s strategy for attaining a 
political goal.
Hart’s definition of strategy and grand strategy have laid the foundations for other 
scholars to expand the concept further, such as the work of Edward Luttwak. In his book 
Strategy, The Logic of War and Peace, Luttwak asserts that studying grand strategy in 
wartime alone is folly, and further points out that strategy can alter depending on the logic 
presented in wartime versus peacetime (1987). Luttwak went on to update and expand the 
definition of grand strategy, extending the analytical focus beyond distinctions of war and 
peace to advocate a certain level of government coordination of resources. Luttwak states: 
“Grand strategy is simply the level at which knowledge and persuasion, or in modern 
terms intelligence and diplomacy, interact with military strength to determine outcomes in 
a world of other states with their own “grand strategies”…” (2009). This represents a 
significant step in the clarification of the term grand strategy, as well as the lower-level 
term strategy, in acknowledging strategy as the government’s use of its available resources 
to achieve a goal.
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As the concept of strategy has expanded beyond the military, and then beyond the 
dichotomy of wartime and peacetime, we can arrive at a defensible idea of what strategy 
looks like. Based on these progressions in definitions, it’s reasonable to think of strategy in 
the Luttwak definition of a state’s comprehensive efforts to achieve an outcome. In 
considering nuclear strategy, we can then logically point to a government’s coordination 
and use of resources to fulfill its nuclear goals, whether that be through economic, military, 
or diplomatic means.
Structural Theories of IR
To answer the question of how states formulate their nuclear strategies, it is 
important to first know the fundamental assumptions we make about states, the way they 
think, and why they desire nuclear weapons in the first place. Beginning with mainstream 
international relations, there are numerous theories explaining state behavior within what 
Graham Allison (1999) describes as the rational actor model or paradigm. Most notably, 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism have become predominant in the IR field for 
their comprehensive and systematic explanations of the character of international life
(Allison and Zelikow, 1999). These theories have been convincingly and consistently used 
to explain state behavior and action in the international environment in countless cases and 
studies, and have demonstrated great value over and over as parsimonious, generalizable, 
and reproducible theories. In other words, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism
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within the rational actor paradigm form the base assumptions for most scholarship about 
states and their behavior, including their nuclear strategy. While these two schools have 
significant differences, neoliberal institutionalism shares most of the core assumptions of 
neorealism with an added assumption about the structural role institutions can play in 
constraining state behavior in addition to anarchy. Since this emphasis on institutions 
mainly concerns the circumstances underlying international cooperation, and considering 
the two theories are described as two-sides of the same coin (Allison and Zelikow, 1999), 
this review will mainly focus on core neorealist assumptions due to their direct relevance 
to a state’s desires for nuclear weapons and their subsequent strategies.
Neorealism seeks to explain international events by taking the foundations of 
classical realism and adding emphasis on the structural aspects of the international system. 
According to Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999) there are five main tenets of 
neorealism: (1) nation-states are unitary actors, and the key units in international relations; 
(2) states are rational actors who analyze decisions based on a cost and benefits analysis 
and choose the best option; (3) the international environment is naturally anarchic and 
jungle-like where all are actors compete with one another to survive and thrive (4) the true 
goal of states is to gain security and relative power over other states, states act politically 
to achieve these goals; (5) system-level factors in the international system determine the 
character and consequences for international life. 
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Kenneth Waltz, one of the pioneers of neorealism, argues that anarchy is the most 
important and defining characteristic of the international environment. Waltz’s core claim 
was that anarchy and differences in relative power of states is the primary causal 
mechanism for international actions taken by states. Within Waltz’s strand of neorealism, 
states are all equal and identical in nature save for one important value: the aggregate 
power of states. The differences in aggregate power are naturally produced by the anarchic 
system. Classical realists like Hans Morgenthau first developed this idea of anarchy but 
did not place the emphasis on structure that Waltz did. Waltz proposes that because the 
anarchic system creates differences in power, the system will try to balance itself as self-
interested and rational states try to secure their own safety and power relative to other 
states (2001). While Waltz makes the assumption that states are self-interested and rational 
in seeking power and security, it is the system that determines state behavior. 
Consequently, the pressures of the international system dictates that states are perpetually 
seeking to rebalance (Waltz, 2001). In sum, Waltz’s idea is that the system is constantly 
trying to balance itself, and this leads to assumptions about state behavior. Due to 
differences in aggregate power, when states are faced with a more powerful state these 
systemic pressures force states to counterbalance. Neorealist scholars are concerned with 
how states try to counterbalance, and primarily focus on military and economy as 
measures of power. Waltz argued that states improved security primarily through military 
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power and alliances, with the strongest security measure being nuclear weapons (Waltz, 
2001).
This forms the basis for what is known as balance of power theory, where 
survival-seeking states are constantly responding to power imbalances in the anarachic 
international system (Waltz, 2001). Great and weaker powers use internal military build up
and alliances for their own security, and thus alignments of states are temporarily made 
which determine the character of international politics. The international system, 
depending on the alignment of powerful states, are most commonly known as unipolar, 
bipolar, and multipolar systems (Waltz, 2010). This theory explains a state’s desire to go 
nuclear given that nuclear weapons represent the greatest security measure, as well as 
informing us as to the strategy a rational nation-state is expected to take in the face of 
anarchic pressures: when nuclear weapons represent the most efficient path to security, a 
state should pursue nuclear weapons development as quickly and efficiently as possible. 
Thus, a state should be expected to make its nuclear decisions and carries out its policies 
with this strategy of efficiency in mind, and this expectation has been widely accepted 
without much inspection (Hymans, 2006). 
Other scholars have slightly modified Waltz’s assumptions of neorealism and 
formed different strands, but focus on the same core assumptions. Concerning the state 
neorealist scholars agree that: unitary states are the principal actors in international life, 
that these states are rational in calculating possible decisions and choosing the maximum 
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valued option, and that their main objectives are survival and power. They also agree that 
the system is the causal mechanism for state behavior, and that anarchy and differences in 
power define the international system. From there variations that broaden and deepen the 
explanatory power of neorealism have emerged. For instance, John Mearsheimer’s (2001)
neorealist strand “offensive realism” makes the same core assumptions as Waltz did but 
conceived how the distribution of power in the system affected states differently. Waltz 
argued that the anarchic system will force states to try to achieve power for the sake of 
survival relative to other states, and once enough power and security is attained to ensure 
survival the state will be content. In contrast Mearsheimer argued that the pressure of the 
international environment makes it impossible for states to know whether they have 
attained enough power to ensure survival so they will therefore continue to maximize their 
utilities and relative advantage over others. This constant offensive state behavior is still 
caused by the anarchic system, but its effects on state behavior are different than the more 
defensive neorealism of Waltz.
Stephen Van Evera (1984) also contributed to the discussion of offense versus 
defense in states based on technological differences in states. Technological limitations or 
advances might also determine whether a state is building up power to defend itself or 
dominate others. This distinction is important for how other states respond to their 
increased offensive or defensive capabilities. Stephen Walt (1987) added that state 
behavior and agency were important alongside structural factors. Walt argued that how 
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states interpret the pressures of the system is important for the establishment of intentions 
and behavior. States respond to systemic threat, not power imbalance, and such threats are 
determined by objective military power but also state intention.
Power transition theory is often considered a distinct research paradigm 
independent from neorealism, but it borrows many of its core assumptions from 
neorealism and provides a structural explanation of international politics distinct but 
comparable to balance of power theory (Organski, 1958; DiCicco and Levy, 1999). Similar 
to balance of power theory, power transition theory assumes nation-states as rational, 
unitary units, focuses its analysis on power differences between states, and points to 
structural variables as the key to explaining state behavior. As in balance of power theory, 
the international system globally and regionally often takes a hierarchal form based on the 
alliances and military build ups of nation-states, with the key difference being that in 
power transition theory states do not necessarily act out of purely survival-seeking 
preferences (DiCicco and Levy, 1999). In addition to the minimum-level goal of security, 
states can act based on their satisfaction with the current power alignment of the 
international system and whether it benefits them or not, determining whether they are 
status quo or revisionist states (Tammen et al., 2000). In other words, in addition to or 
instead of the structural variable anarchy depending on the use of the theory, states are 
affected by another structural variable: the international system under a dominant nation. A 
dominant nation forms a system that perpetuates its power preponderance through military 
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build up and alliances, and states are either in favor of this system (status quo) or against it 
(revisionist) (Tammen et al., 2000). Thus, nuclear weapons can represent a rational 
response for revisionist states in particular to respond to structural differences in power by 
building up their own military capabilities (Cha and Kang, 2003).
In terms of nuclear strategy, these developments in neorealist theory point to an 
increasing number of variables that states respond to when deciding whether to go nuclear 
or not and how to do so if it becomes a rational choice. States, in the neorealist tradition,
can respond to structural variables such as anarchy or the international system through 
offense/defensive orientations, perceptions of threat, and satisfaction with the status quo
when deciding whether to go nuclear or not. Still, the expectation remains that once a state 
decides to go nuclear, they pursue nuclear capabilities as directly and efficiently as 
possible while it is rational to do so.
Three major observations can be established based on these various strands of 
neorealism. Neorealism (as well as neoliberal institutionalism) is a top-down theory that 
contends the anarchic nature of the system and aggregate differences in power are the 
causal mechanisms of international events. As Keith Shimko (1992) summarized: “while 
there is disagreement among neorealists about what exactly anarchy causes, there is 
agreement that anarchy causes it.”  Secondly, neorealism also assumes that states are 
unitary actors who are rational. In regards to nuclear strategy, this mean that the decision 
to go nuclear must be a rational one where a costs and benefit analysis reveals pursuing 
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nuclear proficiency as the most efficient security choice. Thirdly, while structural theories 
answer the question of why states pursue a nuclear weapon, they do not subsequently 
spend much analytical attention to how a state achieves its nuclear goals once they decide 
to go nuclear. It is assumed that when a combination of rationality and the effects of 
systemic variables like anarchy produce the situation where it is in a state’s best security 
interest to pursue nuclear weapons, then the state’s nuclear strategy should reflect the most 
direct path of that pursuit.
A significant example of this structural approach applied to North Korea and its 
nuclear behavior can be seen in Victor Cha and David Kang’s Nuclear North Korea: A 
Debate on Engagement Strategies (2003). David Kang in particular employs the 
assumptions of balance of power theory to explain how the growing gap in military 
capabilities between North Korea and the rival states surrounding them, mainly the US and 
South Korea, has caused North Korea to seek deterrence by going nuclear (2003). Kang 
empirically supports this structural approach by comparing the economic size, defense 
spending, and military capabilities of North Korea to other key states to display the 
growing power gap in the international system, while also arguing that more domestic or 
psychological approaches to the case are basically ad-hoc explanations due to lack of 
information and an inability to prove different outcomes in a counterfactual scenario (Cha 
and Kang, 2003). This international system and its asymmetrical power alignment stacked 
against North Korea support the idea that it is rational for North Korea to close the gap 
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between itself and its rivals, or balancing, through the most efficient means possible: 
nuclear weapons capabilities. Kang notes that while North Korea’s attempts to balance 
may seem threatening, the deterrence of the United States and its allies in turn remains 
consistent in its ability to marginalize the rationality of a preemptive use of force by North 
Korea (Cha and Kang, 2003). Kang ends his appraisal of the North Korean situation by 
pointing to neoliberal institutionalism, or the ability to constrain North Korea’s behaviors 
through systemic incentives, in order to deescalate the tensions on the peninsula (Cha and 
Kang, 2003). This use of structural theory convincingly answers why North Korea would 
seek nuclear weapons capabilities, but as other authors have pointed out, Kang fails to 
address the variance in strategy North Korea employs to reach its nuclear goals (He and 
Feng, 2013).
Alternative Theories on North Korean Nuclear Strategy
While these structural explanations of state behavior have been effectively 
deployed in many cases, the existence of some atypical cases of nuclear strategy have 
resulted in theoretical approaches that modify or deviate from the baseline theories 
described above. In particular, North Korea’s past erratic nuclear behavior indicated an 
inconsistent and/or varied nuclear strategy that is not easily explained. This subsection will 
summarize how scholars have modified or deviated from the structural approaches above
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in significant ways, and subsequently how scholars have explained North Korea’s erratic 
nuclear strategy.
In the book Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies discussed 
above, Victor Cha approaches North Korean nuclear strategy with a structural theoretical 
argument similar to that of his counterpart David Kang (2003). Instead of employing 
balance of power theory, Cha uses power transition theory to explain why North Korea 
wants to go nuclear (Cha and Kang, 2003). The appraisal of North Korea’s status in the 
international system is somewhat similar in that Cha empirically supports the idea that the 
power odds are stacked against North Korea, and thus it should rationally seek to revise 
the status quo. Cha takes a pioneering step; however, in arguing that in some situations of 
high risk such as North Korea’s, a state cannot always perform a perfect cost and benefit 
analysis as expected of a rational actor. Cha argues that prospect theory, an empirically 
supported psychological theory on decision-making under conditions of risk, is a logical 
substitute in this case due to the high risks and short-term time horizons North Korea must 
operate in under such difficult systemic pressures (Cha and Kang, 2003). According to 
prospect theory, which was first developed in laboratory experiments by Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky (1979, 2000), actors make their decisions based on a reference point 
that frames, or splits, their available choices into a domain of gains or a domain of losses. 
Depending on the domain a choice is framed in, an actor responds differently to the risks 
and probabilities associated with a choice. In other words, actors treat prospective win and 
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losses differently. Actors, for instance, are known to be risk-averse in a domain of gains 
and risk-acceptant in a domain of losses, and this implies key decision-making differences 
compared to the rational actor who does not rely on a reference point for help in evaluating 
choices (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Cha takes this theory and combines it with power 
transition theory, using North Korea’s structural position in the international system as the 
reference point, and splits North Korea’s nuclear strategy into two options, or “two faces”, 
where they can choose to try to engage with other states and institutions diplomatically or 
unilaterally pursue its nuclear weapons development (Cha and Kang, 2003). Cha asserts 
that due to North Korea’s constantly decreasing position in the international system, North 
Korea frames its nuclear strategy choices in a domain of losses, meaning they are more 
risk-acceptant. Thus, North Korea uses its aggressive nuclear weapons development, 
threatening diplomacy, and military demonstrations, despite the high risk of loss through 
sanctions, intervention, or war involved with this strategy, to try to provoke the United 
States and South Korea into compromises that revise the power status quo of the region in 
what is known as “coercive bargaining” (Cha and Kang, 2003). This marks a departure 
from the typical rational explanation by arguing that it may in fact be rational for North 
Korea to use a varying nuclear strategy that accepts high risks in pursuing its nuclear goals; 
a strategy not normally expected by a rational state. This argument that North Korea is 
doing the best it can to improve its position in the international system under difficult 
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circumstances is a compelling example of how mainstream IR theory has been modified to 
explain North Korea’s strategic variance.
Following in Cha’s footsteps of using prospect theory as a reasonable substitute 
for rational actor assumptions, Kai He and Huiyun Feng’s (2013) political legitimacy-
prospect model uses neoclassical realism and prospect theory to analyze the first and 
second nuclear crisis in North Korea. Like power transition theory, neoclassical realism is 
a structural realist theory on international relations and serves as the theoretical 
underpinning of the explanation to North Korea’s varying nuclear strategy. Neoclassical 
realism shares many of the basic assumptions of structural realist theory, agreeing on the 
critical point that the distribution of power in the international system is the main 
independent variable for shaping a state’s foreign policy, and thus it’s strategy (He and 
Feng, 2013). The main difference comes in how this system-level variable affects states, or 
put in another way what level of analysis is important to study. Neorealist theory focuses 
solely on “third image”, or system-level variables, while neoclassical realist approaches 
assert that system-level variables like anarchy can also be responded to indirectly through 
“intervening variables” at the “first image” (individual) and “second image” (domestic) 
levels of analysis (He and Feng, 2013). In applying this to North Korean nuclear behavior, 
or what states do, He and Feng argue that North Korea responds to the power distribution 
of the international system through “political legitimacy”, or external and internal threats 
to the North Korean regime’s authoritative control of the country (2013). Invasion from a 
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rival state like the United States, for instance, represents an external threat to political 
legitimacy while famine and economic decay might represent internal threats to North 
Korean leaders’ political control and security. He and Feng go on to describe North 
Korea’s two methods of pursuing nuclear weapons: “publically and provocatively” or 
“secretly and deceptively”, with the former considered high-risk strategy and the second 
low-risk (He and Feng, 2013). They argue that North Korea chooses between the two 
based on whether it thinks its political legitimacy is threatened or not, using the first and 
second nuclear crises to demonstrate how North Korea’s high external security threats 
coincide with its aggressive nuclear policies and how its deceptive bargaining behavior 
inversely coincides with North Korean leaders having strong political legitimacy (He and 
Feng, 2013). Compared to Victor Cha’s neorealist approach, this case study adds a 
significant analytical focus on North Korea’s decision-making and leadership while 
maintaining the assumption that systemic variables are at the heart of North Korea’s 
nuclear strategy.
The final research program that will be introduced here is crisis bargaining. 
Although there are a number of theories and paradigms that deal with strategy and nuclear 
strategy, crisis bargaining in particular has potential for examining North Korea because of 
the crisis-like nature of its disputes with other actors over its nuclear weapons program and 
the constant bargaining-style negotiations North Korea conducts regarding its nuclear 
weapons. Crisis bargaining as pioneered by Powell (1987), Banks (1990), and Fearon 
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(1995) focuses on the interactions between sovereign states and the dynamics of power, 
interest, cooperation, and conflict inherent in those interactions (Snyder and Diesing, 
2015). By studying the specifics of state-to-state interaction, particularly in a “crisis” 
described as “a sequence of interactions between the governments or two or more 
sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a 
dangerously high probability of war”, we can subsequently learn about larger subjects such 
as international politics and relations (Snyder and Diesing, 2015).
As James Fearon’s influential paper “Rationalist Explanations of War” (1995)
exemplifies, crisis bargaining generally involves the use of game theory to mathematically 
map out the possible choices, outcomes, payoffs, or penalties of interactions between states 
in a crisis. Game theory, first developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1945), is a 
theory on the behaviors of decision makers in “games” or situations of strategic 
interdependence. Game theory allows political scientists to precisely define and test 
theoretical assumptions through mathematical models, and then applying these models to 
case studies to see how accurately the empirical evidence matches the model. James 
Fearon’s work demonstrated how game theory could be used in the context of crisis 
bargaining to test how rational states will strategically act to get what they want when their 
interests conflict with another state, and how these interactions can lead to various 
bargaining agreements or ultimately war (1995). Fearon’s paper demonstrated the 
conditions necessary for war, even if all of the conflicting, rational states would both 
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prefer to avoid the extreme costliness of war, and in doing so compellingly modified realist 
assumptions on the role of anarchy in conflict and also set a standard for research on how 
states behave when they disagree enough on an issue to the point that use of force is a 
serious possibility. Much of the crisis bargaining research paradigm has subsequently 
copied or modified this approach by writing their own models to investigate various 
theoretical assumptions (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). Significantly, crisis bargaining 
research and game theoretic models have investigated the assumptions of systemic-level 
theories such as predictive power of balance of power theory in crisis situations amongst 
others (Fearon, 1994; Snyder and Diesing, 2015). Crisis bargaining research represents a 
departure from the mainstream structural IR approaches discussed above because of their 
dynamic study of rational states’ strategy in interactive situations. This allows for depth 
and comprehensiveness in its explanations of strategy, a subject that is mostly ignored or 
assumed away in other schools of research, while also incorporating the theoretical 
assumptions of IR theory. In terms of North Korea’s nuclear strategy, the country is often 
used as a member of large number case study applications of game theoretic models and is 
regarded as a strong candidate for in-depth case-study research due to its history of nuclear 





North Korea’s nuclear strategy under Kim Jong-Un is a natural target for an in-
depth case study. Most of the significant analysis on North Korean nuclear strategy has 
focused on the first and second nuclear crises, so a contemporary study has the potential to 
illustrate if and how their nuclear strategy has changed under new leadership while also 
testing how durable different theories’ explanations are. Additionally, Kim Jong-Un’s 
position as supreme leader is unlikely to change in the short term and an analysis of his 
country’s nuclear strategy under his regime can potentially contribute to an ongoing 
security issue (Hee-gwan Chin et al., 2013). Findings from the analysis might be 
generalizable as well, as North Korea can exemplify patterns in strategy that are common 
in other places as well, such as situations where state decision-making is typified by high 
risk or prior crisis. Methodologically, while quantitative, and large number studies could 
also be effective in studying nuclear strategy, the models being used in this paper are more 
conducive to a comparative approach. An in-depth case study approach to the North 
Korean case allows the paper to consider a diverse range of independent variables, and can 
ultimately lead to the deductive application and evaluation of each model’s assumptions.
But why study North Korean nuclear behavior under Kim Jong-Un specifically? 
This paper focuses on North Korean nuclear behavior from the years 2011 to 2017, 
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beginning with the year Kim Jong-Un is known to have begun his ascent to power and 
subsequently established rule over the North Korean government up (Hee-gwan Chin et al., 
2013; He and Feng, 2013; Chanlett-Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin, 2016). This time period 
was chosen for a few reasons. Firstly, as mentioned previously, two of the models being 
used have previously been applied to North Korea and we could benefit from the 
application of these models to a fresher case. Secondly, as information on North Korea has 
become more reliable over time, albeit inconsistently, it makes sense to use a case with the 
most empirical evidence available to substantiate independent variable claims. Most 
critically, as found in previous time periods of North Korean history, North Korean nuclear 
stratey under Kim Jong-Un displays an observable variance that can be operationalized as 
dependent variables. The strategic variance in North Korea is extremely valuable as a 
research puzzle because it so difficult to explain, and therefore we can rigorously test the 
assumptions of theories by assessing how effectively they can explain such a difficult a 
problem. The three theoretical models used in the paper can use their assumptions to tell a 
causal story that results in the observed variance, and allows us to evaluate how well they 
performed against expectations.
Dependent Variable
The introduction established that the variance in North Korean nuclear strategy
under the Kim Jong-Un regime is the dependent variable, but it is important to flesh out 
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exactly what this means. It is critical to make sure that the way we measure the variance is 
valid and reliable, or ensuring that our dependent variable is measuring what we want to 
measure and is consistent with its measurements.
This paper is concerned with North Korea’s nuclear strategy under Kim Jong-Un
so far in that it displays a tendency to vacillate between a willingness to cooperate with 
international actors on nuclear disarmament and a converse non-willingness. In attempt to 
capture the timing and dynamics of these two strategies, North Korean nuclear strategy as 
the dependent variable has been operationalized into a dichotomous variable with the 
following possible values: fast and slow. This variable isolates the subject of the study, 
which is strategic variance, and assumes that North Korea has a preference for nuclear 
weapons that it is trying to fulfill. Since it is beyond the scope of the paper to investigate 
why North Korea wants nuclear weapons capabilities, or if it truly really wants them, or 
what it hopes to do with them, the dependent variable is simply a reflection of the two 
observable ways North Korea attempts to reach its goal to become a nuclear state. North 
Korean nuclear strategy can be categorized as fast, fast but slow-signaling, slow but fast-
signaling, or slow using the following two-variable framework, which attempts to 
comprehensively capture the variance we are trying to explain: (1) speed; (2) signaling.
Each variable in the framework has a dichotomous value choice that can be determined 
qualitatively based on evidence on the North Korean government’s activity regarding its 
nuclear weapons. Evidence for determining the values of the dependent variable are drawn 
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from secondary academic sources, verified news outlets, intelligence reports, and policy 
papers.
Speed is a straightforward measure of one key component of North Korea’s 
nuclear strategy. It refers to the speed and manner in which North Korea pursues its goal to 
become a nuclear state, or to attain a stockpile of nuclear weapons with second strike and 
intercontinental firing range capability (Hee-gwan et al., 2013). Speed of nuclear weapons 
development can be measured qualitatively as either fast or slow values. Slow indicates 
that North Korea is not openly pursuing nuclear weapons production. It could be secretly 
using its nuclear programs or not using them at all, but ultimately North Korea is not 
actively using its nuclear facilities and resources to pursue nuclear weapons development
in ways obvious to the outside world via official inspection, intelligence, or espionage. 
Fast indicates that North Korea is openly and fully using its nuclear facilities, meaning that 
their nuclear activity is obvious upon inspection, intelligence collection, or espionage of 
their activity. This variable is designed to capture the natural disposition of North Korea’s 
nuclear efforts: is the state pursuing nuclear weapons development openly regardless of 
cost, or in other words are they pursuing nuclear weapons as fast as possible? Activities 
like testing nuclear weapons, opening new nuclear facilities, or public displays of nuclear 
military capability would indicate a fast value while shut down nuclear facilities, absence 
of nuclear-related tests observable to outside actors, and adhering to denuclearization 
agreements would constitute verifiably slow nuclear strategy.
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The signaling variable is taken from the crisis-bargaining literature, in which 
James Fearon (1997) explicates how states use costly signals to express their foreign 
policy interests credibly to other states, whether in a crisis situation or in grand strategy. 
Costly signals, or “messages, gestures, or actions that are costly enough that only an actor 
of a certain type would be able, or willing, to them carry out”, can be considered credible 
if it is costly to the state to back down or make empty promises (Fearon, 1997; Yarhi-Milo, 
Kertzer, and Renshon, 2017). Thus, a state receiving the signal can determine that the 
sending state’s signal legitimately represents its foreign policy interests because the costs 
associated with the signal would deter an unresolved or bluffing state from making it. 
Fearon (1997) indicates two ways in which a state can signal its foreign policy intentions 
to another state: tying hands or sinking costs. Tying hands “means taking an action that 
increases the costs of backing down if the would-be challenger actually challenges but 
otherwise entails no costs if no challenge materialize”, and typically take the form of 
public official statements made by the state that would affect the state’s prestige and 
reputation if it were not carried out (Fearon, 1997). Sinking cost signals are “actions that 
are costly for the state to take in the first place but do not affect the relative value of 
fighting versus acquiescing in a challenge…” indicating that the ex ante, or before the 
outcome, costs of the signal are high enough to be deemed credible (Fearon, 1997). Fearon 
(1997) offers arms build up and military demonstrations of power as examples of this ideal 
type of signaling. In sum, there is empirical evidence to show that states can credibly 
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signal its strategic intentions by making costly signals, or creating audience costs that 
could be suffered by not following through with a threat or offer (Fearon, 1997). As other 
works have shown (Jervis, 1982; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015), reputation is a 
significant factor for states and affect how carefully they send and use costly signals. We 
can therefore reasonably use North Korea’s costly signals as a component in North 
Korea’s nuclear strategy, observing the messages North Korea wishes to convey to other 
actors about its nuclear program.
The signaling variable in this framework can have two valuables determined 
qualitatively: fast-signaling or slow-signaling. If North Korea makes a costly signal to 
other actors about its nuclear intentions via tied hands or sunk-cost signals, then they can 
be categorized as signaling whether North Korea is seeking to speed up or slow down its 
nuclear weapons development. The fast-signaling value indicates that North Korea is 
signaling that it intends to speed up its nuclear weapons to a full, open pursuit. This might 
include threats to test or use missiles or nuclear weapons, leave denuclearization 
negotiations or agreements, or start war over their sovereign right to pursue nuclear 
weapons; examples of tying hands. Examples of sunk-costs could include military 
demonstrations, actual nuclear weapons development-related tests, or limited acts of force. 
The slow-signaling value consists of situations where North Korea signals that it is willing 
to slow down its nuclear weapons development or stop it completely. Observable examples 
include whether North Korea directly or indirectly, and either by own its own initiative or 
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in response to the actions of other actors, verifiably indicated to an international actor its 
willingness to engage in negotiations over its nuclear disarmament. Another signal would 
be North Korea taking verified steps to slow down or hurt its ability to pursue nuclear 
weapons as quickly as possible; a sunk-cost signal.
The values of the framework may overlap, such as a situation where North Korea 
simultaneously scores a fast speed value and a fast-signaling value by testing a nuclear 
weapon, but each measures a distinct element necessary for capturing the essence of North 
Korean nuclear variance. The speed value captures what North Korea is doing with in 
regards to its nuclear activity at that moment, whereas the signaling value is an indication 
of what North Korea wants to do in the future. Additionally, the speed value may be 
partially dictated by other actors; North Korea might score a fast speed value while 
actually desiring to go slow because it requires cooperation and agreement with another 
actor, the United States for instance, who in that instance refused participation.  The 
components can co-vary together or create distinct groupings, which are captured in the 
four broad values of the dependent variable. Fast nuclear strategy consists of a fast value in 
speed and a fast-signaling value in signaling. Fast but slow-signaling strategy is comprised 
of fast speed and slow-signaling values. Slow but fast-signaling strategy is the opposite, 
with a value combination of slow speed and fast-signaling. Finally, slow nuclear strategy 
indicates slow speed and slow-signaling values. These dependent variable values across 
the two components of the framework are consistently observable during the years 2011-
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2017. The four values for the dependent variable and the dichotomous framework provide 
a nuanced measure of North Korea’s nuclear behavior that captures the varying transitions
of strategy North Korea vacillates between.1
In this study, the models will try to explain the transitions between the existing 
dependent variable values during the case study time period. A transition between the four 
strategy types does not have to be ordered; North Korea can switch between any strategy at 
any time. It is important to note that this approach assumes that when North Korea 
transitions to a different dependent variable value, or a different type of nuclear strategy, 
this strategy remains the default until the state observably transitions to a new type of 
strategy. Again, it is the goal of the models to explain North Korean nuclear strategy
variance, and thus the study of the transitions in types of nuclear strategy is most 
important. Based on these dependent variable values, North Korea under Kim Jong-Un 
experienced four transitions from the years 2011 to 2017. 
Transition 1: Right after Kim Jong-Un took power, on February 29th, 2012, North 
Korea transitioned from a fast but slow-signaling nuclear strategy to a completely slow
nuclear strategy when it agreed to the Leap Day Agreement with the United States
(Chanlett-Avery et al., 2016). Prior to the agreement, North Korea was engaged in a full-
out pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities characterized by various nuclear-related tests, 
illegal trading for nuclear resources, and an express desire to pursue nuclear weapons 
                                                 
1 See Table 1 in the Appendix
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publically (Hee-gwan Chin et al., 2013; Chanlett-Avery et al., 2016). Thus, a fast but slow-
signaling strategy type captures that North Korea was still taking a defiant, bold posture 
with its nuclear activity but had expressed interest in negotiation in bilateral talks with the 
United States. After the agreement was announced by both the United States and North 
Korea, North Korea appeared to slow down its nuclear weapons pursuit from a full-out 
pursuit as promised. The agreement was to include the shut down of operations at the 
Yongbyon uranium enrichment plant, admittance of outside nuclear inspectors into North
Korea, and a moratorium on nuclear-related tests in exchange for 240,000 metric tons of 
food aid from the United States (Chanlett-Avery et al., 2016).
Transition 2: Less than a month later that year on March 16th, 2012, North Korea 
announced that it planned to launch a satellite later that year to celebrate the former North 
Korean leader Kim Il-Sung’s legacy (Chanlett-Avery et al., 2016). Other international 
actors, including the United States, deemed this to be a possible act of nuclear weapons 
development considering the shared technology of satellite launching and intercontinental 
ballistic missile technology, and thus a violation of the Leap Day agreement (Chanlett-
Avery et al., 2016). Considering the audience costs created by threatening to launch a 
satellite while in an agreement with the United States, North Korea showed an observable 
transition to slow but fast-signaling nuclear strategy.
Transition 3: On April 13th, 2012, North Korea attempted to launch its weather 
satellite into orbit, using rocket engines that are also used for their ballistic missiles 
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(Chanlett-Avery et al., 2016). The United States subsequently cancelled its food aid plans 
to North Korea, signifying the end of the Leap Day Agreement. Although the launch was a 
failure, North Korea subsequently continued launching rocket-powered satellites and 
tested a nuclear devise while reopening its Yonbyon facilities (Chanlett-Avery et al., 2016). 
This demonstrates an observable turn based on the dependent variable framework, from 
slow but fast-signaling to fast nuclear strategy. It is clear North Korea had resumed full out 
pursuit of its nuclear weapons development.
Transition 4: On January 10th, 2015, after a long period of using the fast nuclear 
strategy that included the testing of nuclear weapons and missile systems, various 
threatening statements, and a continued lack of participation in any treaty or agreement on 
nuclear weapons, North Korea contacted the United States to officially reopen bilateral 
negotiations (Davenport, 2017). This came at a time when North Korea recently 
announced plans to test a fourth nuclear device in the previous year. The offer entailed a 
moratorium on nuclear weapons testing in exchange for the cancelling of the annual US-
ROK joint military exercise to decrease tensions. While the United States rejected the offer 
of negotiation, this demonstrated a transition from fast nuclear strategy to a fast but slow-
signaling strategy based on the offering of a costly signal. The gesture of reopening 
negotiations for a denuclearization deal is a tying hands signal as North Korea trying to 
engage with the United States creates audience costs and hurts their ability to bargain in 
the future if they make an empty offer.
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Transition 5: On February 7th, 2015, Kim Jong-Un personally oversees a missile 
test following the rejection of its offer to the US (Davenport, 2017). This can be 
characterized as a sunk-cost signal, where the official reporting of Kim Jong-Un’s personal 
oversight of the tests displaying an arms build-up signal of North Korea’s intentions to 
pursue an unequivocal fast nuclear strategy. Following the tests, North Korea continued 
fast speed nuclear development with various intercontinental ballistic missile tests and a 
nuclear detonation in January of 2016. Additionally, in May of 2016 North Korea held a 
congress for its only major political party, where Kim Jong-Un announced its intentions to 
have nuclear weapons and to refrain from using them unless North Korea’s sovereignty 
was encroached upon (Davenport, 2017). This would indicate a full resumption of fast 
nuclear strategy by North Korea, ending its costly signaling of openness to slow down its 
nuclear weapons development.
Transition 6: On July 6th, 2016, North Korea releases an official statement 
indicating its willingness to resume denuclearization talks with the United States and 
South Korea (Davenport, 2017). The statement laid out significant conditions for any 
agreement, including the denuclearization of the entire Korean peninsula as well as the 
removal of security threats from the US. Considering the high level government 
spokesman used to communicate the message, which is generally only used when North 
Korea hopes to convey a sincere message, the statement could be considered a costly, 
credible signal of tying hands (Carlin, 2016). Thus, North Korea transitioned from a fast 
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nuclear strategy to a fast but slow-signaling nuclear strategy once again by not necessarily 
slowing down its nuclear weapons development at the time but expressing a desire to slow 
it down pending the interest of other actors. The United States responds by designating 
Kim Jong-Un and other top North Korean officials as having committed human rights 
abuses, an indirect rejection of the offer (Carlin, 2016). Also, South Korea and the United 
States announce their decision to deploy a missile defense system in South Korea intended 
to stop intercontinental ballistic missiles (Davenport, 2017).
Transition 7: The final transition occurs on August 3rd, 2016, when North Korea 
fires a medium range ballistic missile off the coast of Japan in a clear sunk cost signaling 
of its willingness to resume its fast nuclear strategy in full (Davenport, 2017). Shortly after 
North Korea detonates its fifth nuclear test, and continues ICBM missile testing as well as 
public demonstrations of missile capabilities. In 2017, North Korea announce plans to test 
more missiles in response to remarks by United States President Trump, conduct their 
sixth nuclear test, and Kim Jong-Un personally advocates for its pursuit of nuclear 
weapons in light of threats President Trump makes towards North Korea regarding their 
nuclear activity (Davenport, 2017).
These seven transitions capture the strategic variance North Korea has displayed 
under the Kim Jong-Un era, and provide a systematic and empirically evidenced dependent 
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variable that can be used to test and compare the hypotheses of theoretical models.2 We 
can see that depending on the cooperation of the United States, and to a lesser extent South 
Korea, that North Korea varies its strategy from a completely fast pursuit of nuclear 
weapons to an occasional willingness to slow down its nuclear activity. In the following 
sections, the coercive bargaining model, the political legitimacy-prospect model, and the
crisis bargaining “madman” model will be applied to explain these observable transitions.
Coercive Bargaining Model:
As briefly discussed in the literature review, Victor Cha’s coercive bargaining 
model was applied to explain North Korea’s nuclear behavior during the rule of Kim Jong-
Il, and was intended to contrast the previously inductive explanations of the state’s 
behavior with a more systematic approach (2003). Cha attempted to explain North Korea’s 
“two faces”, or variance in its nuclear policies, by using both power transition theory, 
based on neorealist assumptions, and prospect theory. Cha put forth a “coercive bargaining” 
explanation that argued North Korea, due to its relatively weaker position in the 
international system compared to other regional actors, could choose a rational strategy of 
provoking other states like the US and South Korea with its nuclear weapons. The 
rationale for these provocations would be that small-scale provocations would lead the 
                                                 
2 See Table 2 in the Appendix
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other states to compromise and lessen the gap in relative power between them. To support 
these arguments, Cha uses neorealist principles to serve as the basis for North Korea’s 
nuclear strategy while using prospect theory to reflect the risky decision-making involved 
in going nuclear. Below, the key theoretical assumptions of the model, independent 
variables these assumptions point to, and the logic of the model in practice will be 
explained before presenting hypothesis that will be applied to our case study.
Theoretical Background and Assumptions
The coercive bargaining model is based on the theoretical assumptions of power 
transition theory and prospect theory. Power transition theory, as described in the literature 
review, assumes that the power distribution of the international system is the main causal 
driver for state behavior. Thus, the model is an explanation of North Korea’s nuclear 
strategy by focusing on how the power distribution as an independent variable affects the 
strategy that North Korea takes. Power transition theory also categorizes states within the 
international system as status quo or revisionist, based on whether the international system 
benefits them or not (Tammen et al., 2000). In the original model, and consistent with most 
approaches in IR theory, power distributions are determined by comparing economic size, 
defense spending, and military capabilities (Cha and Kang, 2003). If a state is in an 
unfavorable position in the international system, as a revisionist state it will try to change 
the power balance in the system to its own advantage through military build up of its 
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capabilities or through alliances (Waltz, 1987; DiCicco and Levy, 1999). A state may 
choose its strategy of closing the power gap through various ways, but offense and 
defensive balance, or whether military capabilities favors the attacker or defender, plays a 
significant role in this decision-making according to the model (Van Evera, 1984; Cha and 
Kang, 2003). This model also replaces the standard expected-utility model, or rational 
actor assumption, with the alternative prospect theory to explain a state’s decision-making 
process and how a state can make rational decisions in a seemingly non-rational way 
(Chan and Kang, 2003). This is based on the idea that international politics and security 
issues in particular present inherently high-risk, highly uncertain situations that prospect 
theory specializes in. To understand the dynamics of the model, prospect theory’s core 
assumptions and how it differs from the standard rational actor assumptions will be 
detailed below.
Prospect theory, as developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979), 
assumes that an actor’s decision-making and preferences revolve around a reference point 
that the actor use to evaluates assets and choices. This is in direct contrast to the expected-
utility rational actor model where the costs and benefits are weighed completely 
objectively. Based on this idea that the reference point is central, prospect theory offers a 
general process of choice making. First, in an editing phase an actor identifies a reference 
point through a process called framing, using available information like expectations, 
aspirations, social norms, and social comparisons. The actor also assigns value and 
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probability of outcomes to available options around this reference point. Second, in the 
evaluation phase where essentially the values of possible outcomes are combined with 
their weighted or compared probabilities, and the actor uses the product to make decisions. 
In other words, actors do not have a consistent and transitive set of preferences and their 
behavior is not always conducive to maximizing these preferences. Consequently, 
behavior becomes non-linear or rational. Instead of making choices that attempt to 
maximize total welfare or wealth for instance, actors make choices according to probable 
gains and losses of actions that revolve around a given reference point.
Another key assumption in prospect theory is that actors care more about changes 
to assets than net asset levels. Essentially, actors are more concerned with gains and losses 
that are given meaning by a reference point than the total or net worth of an option. This 
claim invites a critical subset of assumptions about gains and losses. First, actors treat 
gains and losses differently. They tend to overvalue losses compared to relatively equal 
gains. This affects actors’ behavior in what is called loss aversion. For instance, an actor 
will probably not engage in an activity that has an equal chance of success or failure since 
the actor tends to overweight the failure. Typically, 50-50 gambles are not taken. 
Regarding gains and losses, the endowment effect refers to the motion that actors tend to 
overvalue assets they already possess as opposed to comparable assets they do not have. 
The endowment effect implies that losing an asset is worse than acquiring an asset of 
comparable value. This means that an actor might work or pay more to keep an asset than 
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they ever would to attain that asset if it did not belong to them, again pointing to what 
seems like irrational behavior. A third sub-assumption called status quo bias merely 
implies that actors tend to treat the costs of moving away from the status quo as losses and 
the benefits of moving away as gains. This is based on the notion that actors overvalue 
losses so they tend to remain at the status quo. The last sub-assumption in regards to gains 
and losses is called risk orientation, which simply states that actors are risk-averse in the 
domain of gains and risk-acceptant when it comes to losses, with a reflection effect around 
the reference point. This explains a tendency of actors’ choices; if the possible outcome is 
a gain then the actor will probably not take much risk to achieve it, but if there is a 
possible loss then the actor will be far more inclined to take risks in order to avoid it.
Finally, prospect theory assumes that framing is absolutely crucial to choice 
making. Framing is the identification of a reference point, and given the role of the 
reference point in shaping an actor’s valuations of assets and choices the actual process of 
establishing the reference point is extremely important. Most instances of framing the 
reference point depend on the setting or situation, and usually the status quo, or the pre-
determined situation, is made to be the reference point. A change in frame is just as 
important as establishing the original frame, which can easily result in reference point, 
preference, and value changes. This is known as preference reversal. For instance, the 
difference between using the words “intervention” and “invasion” can mean all the 
difference in shaping an actor’s preferences, values, and choices. It is also vital to take into 
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account dynamic situations where the reference point and frame might have a high 
likelihood of changing, and an actor’s behavior might be altered substantially with each 
successive choice. In a sequence of choice making, the instant endowment effect may 
occur, which is described as an actor instantly accommodating to previous gains and 
treating these acquired gains as their own assets. The important point to recall is that actors 
value losing an asset much more than gaining an asset of comparable value.
Based on these assumptions and effects, the coercive bargaining model can 
explain the manner in which a revisionist state attempts to change the power balance status 
quo in its favor based on the risks associated with a revisionist strategy and how the 
strategy is framed. 
The Model
The main logic at work for the coercive bargaining model is that North Korea 
finds itself in a losing situation due to its weak position in the international system’s power 
distribution. Its main rivals, including the United States and South Korea, have been 
pulling farther and farther away from North Korea in terms of economic size, defense 
spending, and military capabilities, which are the most common indicators of power in 
international relations theory (Cha and Kang, 2003). Additionally, North Korea is 
technically still at war with South Korea and the United States, and the US has shown an 
express desire for a regime change and the denuclearization of North Korea (Cha and 
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Kang, 2003). Thus, North Korea finds itself in an untenable situation where the growing 
power gaps between itself and its rivals indicates that it is constantly losing its security and 
the future will eventually bring an unacceptable outcome. According to the model, this is 
the exact scenario necessary for preventive or preemptive action by a revisionist state to 
change the status quo. Preemptive action, as described by Cha (2003), is “when a state 
perceives aggression by another as imminent and acts first to forestall the impending 
attack,” while preventive action is “when a state is motivated to attack first, or otherwise 
suffer increasing inferiority in capabilities vis-à-vis the opponent over time.” In the North 
Korean case, this preventive or preemptive action takes the form of its aggressive nuclear 
strategy to develop nuclear weapons despite the high risk involved in doing so. 
Aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons can have the gains of attaining nuclear deterrence 
capabilities or forcing the United States and South Korea to compromise to a level that it 
was unwilling to before, thereby changing the status quo in North Korea’s favor. Thus, it 
becomes rational in certain situations to pursue nuclear weapons. The main mechanism 
responsible for North Korea’s decision to employ an aggressive, coercive bargaining 
strategy as Cha calls it, or in this study classified as fast nuclear strategy, versus a less 
risky nuclear strategy such as not seeking nuclear weapons at all, pursuing them in secret, 
or trying to change the status quo through other means as captured by slow nuclear 
strategy, is their perception of their power position in the international system. The model 
uses prospect theory to split the action choices of using preventive/preemptive action or 
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not into a domain of gains, neutrality, or losses based on the reference point, or status quo, 
of their power position. Remembering the concept of risk orientation, we know that actors 
treat potential gains and losses differently. In a domain of gains, actors are risk-averse, 
meaning that the calculation of probable losses is considered more strongly than the 
calculation of probable gains. In a domain of losses, actors are risk-acceptant, meaning 
they are more willing to accept a risky choice to avoid a loss to their current status quo. 
Applied to North Korea, we can equate the preemptive/preventive action choice with a fast 
nuclear strategy considering the ability of nuclear weapons to alter the status quo in a 
losing situation. We also assume that fast nuclear strategy is highly risky because of the 
probability of significant losses of nuclear testing and other provocations inherent in fast 
nuclear strategy, such as military intervention or sanctions from the United States, South 
Korea, and the international community. Based on North Korea’s reference point, or status 
quo within the international system, the model indicates that North Korea will choose its 
nuclear strategy based on the riskiness of the nuclear strategy and how favorable its 
position is in the international system.3 In terms of empirically determining the framing of 
the nuclear strategies with domains of gains, neutrality, or loss, Victor Cha gives the 
following four criteria that can be qualitatively determined: (1) fulfillment of ideational, 
national objectives, (2) economic and military well-being, (3) status in the international 
system, (4) availability of allies (Cha and Kang, 2003).
                                                 
3 See Table 3 in the Appendix
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Hypothesis Set for the Coercive Bargaining Model
The coercive bargaining model points us to the power distribution of the 
international system, and whether North Korea’s position is getting better or worse, as the 
main independent variables for its choice of nuclear strategies. Each of the four strategies 
represents an ordinal level of risk that corresponds to how much risk North Korea is 
willing to make in regards to accomplishing its nuclear goals, dependent on the domain the 
strategies are framed in. We can thus put forward the following hypotheses:
H1: North Korea will use a fast nuclear strategy when it is framed in a domain of 
losses and offense has the advantage. This is when North Korea is in a losing situation in 
regards to its power position, meaning its rival states are increasing the power gap to an 
untenable to degree. Therefore, North Korea accepts the most risk with the highest reward 
by pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities as quickly as possible to revise the power 
imbalance. North Korea must believe that despite the high risk of failure, the nuclear 
weapons capabilities and subsequent deterrence they seek are achievable.
H2: North Korea will employ a fast but slow-signaling strategy when it is framed in a 
domain of losses but defense has the advantage. Similar to H1, North Korea’s increasing 
power gap makes the current situation untenable and thus they should pursue nuclear 
weapons as fast as possible even with the likelihood that they will fail. Due to the 
increased likelihood of failure via US intervention, internal failure, or other risks that 
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indicates an advantage for North Korea’s opponents, North Korea will try “coercive 
bargaining” where it uses its nuclear weapons development as a bargaining tool to seek 
compromises from the US and other rivals.
H3: North Korea will employ a fast but slow-signaling strategy when it is framed in a 
neutral domain but offense has the advantage. This means that North Korea’s position is 
remaining relatively constant or a non-losing level for North Korea, but pursuing nuclear 
weapons presents an advantage that North Korea can leverage for increased gains, North 
Korea will attempt to coercively bargain for a decrease in the power gap between itself and 
its rivals.
H4: North Korea will use a slow but fast-signaling strategy when it is framed in a 
neutral domain but defense has the advantage. Like H3, North Korea deems itself in a non-
losing situation in regards to its power position but the calculation of risk and payoffs from 
going nuclear are not favorable. Thus, North Korea will hedge and pursue a slow nuclear 
strategy to avoid the high risks of fast nuclear weapons pursuit, but signal that they may 
change to an active pursuit in order to increase possible gains from compromise.
H5: When North Korea is in a domain of gains, or when it perceives its position in the 
international system to be improving relative to the status quo, and offense has the 
advantage it will employ either a slow but fast-signaling or a slow nuclear strategy. 
Because its position is improving, and as described with the endowment effect, North 
Korea will be risk-averse and try to avoid losses to the state’s newly increased position and 
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therefore will take the low-risk slow strategy. However, if the gains from the prospects of 
going nuclear are high enough, it may signal that it is willing to pursue nuclear weapons 
actively to further increase its bargaining gains.
H6: When North Korea is framed in a domain of gains and defense has the advantage, 
the state will use a slow nuclear strategy. This indicates that like in H5 the power 
distribution is changing favorably for North Korea, and that it will protect these increases 
in power balance by not taking risky behavior. Since defense has the advantage, the 
increased risk of fast nuclear strategy eliminates the possibility that they will signal for a 
pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
These six hypotheses correspond to the different scenarios under which the model 
would expect North Korea to employ one of the four types of nuclear strategy observed in 
the case. Thus, we should be able to observe changes in North Korea’s power distribution 
status in the international system and the corresponding affects this has on its perceptions 
of nuclear strategy risks to explain the seven transitions that have occurred during the Kim 
Jong-Un regime. If the independent variable of changing power balance co-varies in line 
with the changes in the dependent variable as expected, we can reasonably assume the 
model adequately explains the variance by the preliminary congruence test standards used 
for this study.
Application to the Case
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Transition 1: Fast but Slow-Signaling to Slow, February 29th, 2012
Prior to February 29th, 2012, North Korea displayed a fast but slow-signaling 
nuclear strategy as it negotiated bilaterally with the United States while it simultaneously 
introduced and consolidated Kim Jong-Un’s rise to leadership. North Korea had in 2011 
expressed an interest in returning to the negotiating table about denuclearization after 
developing its uranium enrichment facilities and increased tensions with South Korea 
following shelling of the South Korean Yeonpyeong island in 2010 (Davenport, 2017). 
This coincided with the death of Kim Jong-Il, the former leader of North Korea, and the 
official announcement of Kim Jong-Un as the new supreme leader of the country in late 
2011 (Davenport, 2017). Shortly after, North Korea and the United States announced their 
Leap Day Agreement, marking the transition into a period of slow North Korean nuclear 
strategy. For a brief period, North Korea seemed to agree to slow its nuclear weapons 
development with its moratorium and adhere to the deal faithfully. This change in nuclear 
strategy should thus indicate a change in how North Korea interpreted its position in the 
international system and an offense versus defense balance of preemptive/preventive 
action, or pursuing nuclear weapons. We should expect to see evidence indicating a change 
in North Korea’s power position to switch its framing of nuclear strategy choices from a 
domain of losses to a domain of gains with defense having an advantage, as predicted in 
H3 and H6.
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Based on a variety of state and scholarly resources, it is fairly easy to establish that 
North Korea is operating in a domain of losses before the Leap Day Agreement based on 
its position in the international system. From an ideational standpoint, Kim Jong-Un’s 
nascent rise to power was consolidated on the prestige of his father and grandfather’s 
legacy (Hee-gwan Chin et al., 2013). In other words, Kim Jong-Un had to prove he could 
lead the country in the way his predecessors had. Considering its economic and military 
wellbeing and alliance strength compared to the power of a combined United States, South 
Korea, and Japan, North Korea was in a far inferior position in terms of capabilities and 
alliance (Goo and Lee, 2014). The four criteria for determining a decisional frame all 
indicate that North Korea, as it had been for around two decades prior, was in a losing 
situation compared to its rivals. In terms of offense and defensive advantage of a 
preemptive/prevent action like developing and using a nuclear weapon, the United States, 
South Korea and other major regional rivals had a nuclear deterrence and military strength 
advantage despite North Korea’s advances in nuclear technology (Chanlett-Avery et al.,
2016). This would indicate that in accordance with H3, North Korea was pursuing a fast 
but slow-signaling nuclear strategy due to its risk-acceptant behaviors and attempt to 
coercively bargain a deal with its rivals to change the status quo. Thus, a change to slow 
nuclear strategy would indicate a change to a domain of gains, where North Korea believes 
its status quo position in the system is improving and thus would not take a risky nuclear 
strategy like a fast one to jeopardize its gains as explicated in H6. The Leap Day 
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Agreement must then logically have such a status quo changing payoff for North Korea 
through its coercive bargaining that it is willing to slow down or stop its nuclear 
development.
This does not seem to be the case; however, considering that the payoffs given to 
North Korea from the United States were 240,000 metric tons of food aid and the implicit 
increase in serious negotiations with higher stakes in exchange for the freezing of its 
nuclear facilities and moratorium on nuclear-related testing (Chanlett-Avery et al., 2016). 
While the risks to the nuclear weapons program was not high, the payoff of the Leap Day 
Agreement do not significantly change the power imbalance in the international system to 
North Korea’s benefit. The power gap in military, economy, and alliance capabilities had 
not been significantly changed enough to warrant a slow nuclear strategy as expected in 
H6. In other words, the model would expect North Korea to coerce much higher, much 
more significant payoffs from its coercive bargaining efforts with its nuclear strategy.
Transition 2: Slow to Slow but Fast-Signaling, March 16th, 2012
The threat by North Korea to launch a weather satellite in honor of Kim Il-Sung 
marks the transition from slow to slow but fast-signaling nuclear strategy. So why would 
North Korea change course and threaten the potential gains from its new Leap Day 
Agreement? The coercive bargaining model would point to a change to a domain of gains 
with offensive advantage (H5) or a neutral domain with a defensive advantage (H4) in 
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regards to its reference point of its own power status in the system. So is there evidence to 
support either of these hypotheses?
For the same reasons listed for the first transition, there is little evidence to suggest 
the payoffs of the Leap Day Agreement is enough to change the structural power 
disparities between North Korea and its rival states significantly to the point that it 
perceives its position in a domain of gains. The food aid had not been delivered at that 
point, and further negotiations had not taken place to increase the payoffs of further 
agreements (Davenport, 2017). Likewise, there is little evidence to suggest that North 
Korea saw itself in a neutral domain, or a non-losing situation, considering nothing had 
structurally changed about its prior losing power position because of its Leap Day 
Agreement payoffs. It is conceivable that North Korea was bluffing, or attempting to 
coerce a stronger payoff from the United States by threatening a satellite launch, but the 
audience costs of announcing a planned launch and the risk involved in losing the Leap 
Day Agreement do not support this logic. Therefore, the model’s hypotheses 
corresponding to this type of nuclear strategy are not empirically supported to explain this 
transition.
Transition 3: Slow but Fast-Signaling to Fast, April 12th, 2012
Less than a month after threatening to launch their satellite, North Korea actually 
did so in a failed attempt to use ballistic rocket technology to push a weather satellite into 
Earth’s orbit. This started a clear transition to fast nuclear strategy, and was followed by 
51
uninterrupted pursuit of nuclear weapons development through various tests and 
government policies supporting its nuclear program. According to the model, a fast nuclear 
strategy indicates that North Korea sees itself in a domain of losses with an offensive 
advantage (H1). We are therefore looking for evidence to suggest that North Korea must 
have framed its nuclear strategy choices in a domain of losses based on its losing power 
situation, and thought a high risk solution like a nuclear weapons program provided its best 
chance of changing the status quo if successful.
As in the cases of the previous two transitions, there is an abundance of evidence 
to suggest that along economic, military, and alliance indicators, North Korea was in a 
drastically inferior power position compared to its rival states and would thus frame their 
choices within a domain of losses. Considering that North Korea subsequently launched a 
satellite into orbit successfully following the failed launched along with other 
progressively impressive missile tests, tested another nuclear device in 2013, and the 
available intelligence on North Korean nuclear technology at the time, there is empirical 
support for the idea that North Korea saw its ability to alter the status quo through the 
attainment of functional nuclear capabilities (Davenport, 2017; Kim and Cohen, 2017). In 
this case, the transition to a fast nuclear strategy seems supported by the rational choice to 
take a high-risk strategy in an untenable, losing circumstance.
Transition 4: Fast to Fast but Slow-Signaling, January 10th, 2015
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After three years of nuclear behavior consistent with a fast nuclear strategy, such 
as nuclear device tests and missile testing designed to increase North Korea’s missile range 
and ability to carry nuclear weapon payloads, North Korea conveys a rare public offer to 
suspend its planned fourth nuclear test in exchange for the cancellation of the annual US-
ROK joint military exercises that have bothered North Korea in the past (Davenport, 2017). 
This public announcement through its official news agency, which claims North Korea 
offered the United States, was legitimate enough to illicit a rejection by the United States’ 
State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki, claiming that the nuclear issue and the military 
drills were separate issues (Davenport, 2017). Nonetheless, this indicates a gesture or offer 
with real audience costs that put North Korea’s prestige on the line, since they would be 
complied to agree or suffer reputation and possibly conflict costs if the United States had 
agreed and North Korea rescinded its offer. Thus, North Korea suddenly changed from fast 
to fast but slow-signaling strategy, dependent on negotiations with the United States. 
According to the model, we should expect North Korea to change to this type of nuclear 
strategy when it sees its strategic choices in a domain of losses with a defensive advantage
(H2) or in a neutral domain with offensive advantage (H3). 
There is yet again little evidence to support North Korea seeing its position in a 
non-losing or neutral position considering the consistently large gaps in economic, military, 
and alliance capabilities between North Korea and its rival states. Instead, as has been the 
case for the entirety of the Kim Jong-Un era up to this point, North Korea finds itself in the 
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same losing situation considering the imbalance of power in Northeast Asia (Goo and Lee, 
2014; Pollack, 2017). Therefore, H3 is not supported, but there is evidence to suggest that 
the offense-defense balance had shifted in favor of defense (Pollack, 2017).  From its 
adversaries, South Korea launched its own missile tests in 2014 in a defensive response to 
North Korea, while the United States expanded its sanctions on nuclear-related trade 
entities and individuals (Davenport, 2017). Additionally, North Korea’s strongest ally 
China declared a red line on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and states its 
commitment to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, presenting another obstacle to 
offensive advantage. Thus, the second hypotheses aligns with the change in strategy by 
North Korea, explaining this change through North Korea’s interpretation of risks attached 
to a fast nuclear strategy.
Transition 5: Fast but Slow-Signaling to Fast, February 7th 2015
The return to a full, fast nuclear strategy was highlighted by the costly signal of 
launching an anti-ship missile with the leader Kim Jong-Un reported as present for the test 
(Davenport, 2017). Kim Jong-Un personally being present for an aggressive military test, 
open to the world, indicates North Korea’s foreign policy plan to continue its pursuit of 
nuclear weapons with no intentions of backing or slowing down based on the costs this 
would do to the national and personal image of North Korea and Kim Jong-Un 
respectively. Fast nuclear strategy indicates an offensive advantage in a domain of losses 
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(H1), and there should be evidence to support the idea that North Korea believed a 
preventive/preemptive action was viable through its nuclear weapons development.
There is evidence to support the hypothesis, based on the subsequent tests North 
Korea conducted within the year and based on the intelligence and scholarly estimates of 
its nuclear technology. North Korea conducted several missile tests that would further its 
nuclear weapons capabilities significantly such as a successful submarine-based ballistic 
missile launch, several intermediate-ranged ballistic missile tests, and another nuclear 
detonation that the country claims is a hydrogen bomb (Davenport, 2017). Additionally, 
intelligence and scholars had reason to believe that North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic 
missiles were nearly operational (Chanlett-Avery et al., 2016; Kim and Cohen, 2017). This 
is consistent with the model’s first hypothesis expectations.
Transition 6: Fast to Fast but Slow-Signaling, July 6th, 2016
On July 6th, 2016, a high-level North Korean government spokesman released a 
statement declaring North Korea’s openness to resume denuclearization talks provided 
conditions were met on the agreed definition of denuclearization and the ceasing of 
threatening behavior between countries (Carlin, 2016). This message constitutes a costly 
signal wherein North Korea would suffer audience costs if it backed down from its 
willingness to cooperate, yet the United States responded by adding Kim Jong-Un and 
other North Korean leaders to its designations of human rights abuses (Carlin, 2016). 
Despite the negotiating failure, this signal represents a change in nuclear strategy from fast 
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to fast but slow-signaling, which is expected when North Korea is located in a domain of 
losses with defense having the advantage (H2) or a neutral domain with offensive having 
the advantage (H3).
The evidence almost exactly mirrors that of the fourth transition, where there is 
little evidence to support along economic, military, or alliance capability indicators that 
North Korea had improved its power position enough to consider itself in a non-losing 
situation in the international system. However, while clearly located in a domain of losses, 
developments in South Korea and the United States again shifted the advantage to defense. 
Increased sanctions by the United States and the United Nations Security Council on North 
Korean nuclear-related trade, and the newly planned implementation of the Terminal 
High-Altitude Area Defense battery (THAAD) in South Korea further pushed the 
offensive-defensive balance in the defensive direction (Davenport, 2017). This evidence 
seems to support the hypothesis that North Korea would hedge their nuclear weapons 
strategy to open up coercive bargaining options in a losing situation as the viability of 
nuclear-based preemptive/preventive action decreased.
Transition 7: Fast but Slow-Signaling to Fast, August 3rd, 2016
North Korea returned to completely fast nuclear strategy through the costly 
signaling of arms build up, or a message through missile testing in August of 2016. This 
indicated North Korea was once again unwilling to back down on its nuclear ambitions 
and was followed by a slew of submarine-based missile tests, ICBM tests, and a fifth 
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nuclear test (Davenport, 2017). The return to fast nuclear strategy is explained in the 
model’s first hypothesis, where North Korea’s strategic choices are framed in a domain of 
losses and offensive has the advantage.
The successful testing of SLBM’s, ICBM’s, and a nuclear device indicate North 
Korea is closes than ever to second-strike capability and viable preemptive/preventive 
action through nuclear means (Armstrong, 2017; Kim and Cohen, 2017; Pollack, 2017). 
While the THAAD system was implemented in South Korea, North Korea has estimated 
strike range of up to Los Angeles, Denver, and Chicago (Davenport, 2017; Kim and Cohen, 
2017). The fast nuclear strategy reflects that North Korea, while in a losing position, is 
rationally justified in its pursuit of viable nuclear capabilities that could drastically alter the 
power status quo through military build up. The hypothesis provides a reasonable 
explanation for North Korea’s transition to fast nuclear strategy.
Analysis
In sum, the coercive bargaining model provides a compelling, structural 
explanation for North Korea’s strategic nuclear variance. Adjusted for a new time period, 
the model provides a logical story for why North Korea transitions between seeming as if 
they want to cooperate on denuclearization or wanting to go full nuclear. North Korea’s 
drastically inferior power capabilities and position in the international system force them 
to take high-risk strategies, like fast or fast but slow-signaling strategies, to change the 
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status quo in their favor due to the likeliness of the future being worse if they do not act. 
Based on the offensive-defensive balance, North Korea will likely pursue nuclear weapons 
at full speed when it thinks the outcome is viable enough, but hedges to a coercive 
bargaining strategy when defense gains an advantage. The coercive bargaining buys them 
more time through a possibly status quo changing agreement while still allowing them to 
pursue nuclear weapons capabilities without slowing down. The model is weak; however, 
in explaining why North Korea agreed to such low payoffs in the Leap Day Agreement 
and upon agreeing to it, explaining what changed in the short time after the agreement to 
compel them to switch back to a fast nuclear strategy. This indicates that while structural, 
power-based explanations may play an important role in determining North Korea’s 
nuclear strategy, there are likely other factors at play and thus it cannot provide a full 
picture of North Korea’s rationale. In the very least, the ways states interpret and respond 
to the main causal driver of anarchy and its complementary effect on power imbalances in 
the international system may be more diverse than a focus on capabilities and offensive-
defensive balance alone would indicate.
The “Madman” Model:
Another way of looking at North Korean nuclear strategy is through crisis 
bargaining theory, where we can produce explanations by examining the strategic 
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interactions between states on a conflicting issue. North Korea, the United States, and 
South Korea disagree on whether North Korea should be allowed to have nuclear weapons 
enough to threaten the use of force or use it in small doses to the point that war is possible. 
In this situation, the two sides alone cannot resolve the dispute without giving up and both 
are better off by coming to an agreement to split the higher payoffs of cooperation rather 
than fighting a war over it, which would be the most costly resolution to both sides. The 
dynamics of any agreement are complicated by the fact that no one is forcing them to 
make an agreement; sovereign states are not obliged to cooperate unless they agree to on 
their own terms in the anarchy of international politics. In other words, they are playing a 
non-cooperative bargaining game to see who gets the best piece of the pie they would 
share through an agreement that settles the conflict. This is a different way of looking at 
nuclear strategy from the coercive bargaining model for instance because it recognizes the 
impact of strategy by other important players beyond North Korea, and stresses the 
important of state’s choices more than structural approaches will allow. Game theory is 
able to map out the entire catalogue of possible strategic interactions and outcomes of a 
bargaining game, and thus the ideal or probable strategies for each player, from start to end 
by using mathematical models to design the rules of the game and the characteristics of the 
players. Traditionally, one of the main characteristics of states in game theory models and 
IR theories in general is assuming they are completely strategically rational, or assuming 
they will always pick the best option available to them to attain their preferred outcome.
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Additionally, all of the other states know that every other state shares this strategic 
rationality. This characteristic allows for crisis bargaining theorists to explore likely 
strategies and outcomes for states in conflict over an issue, and the conditions for war and 
peace, as closely similar to real life as possible, and thus we gain valuable explanations of 
state interactions. The “madman” model, developed by Avidit Acharya and Edoardo Grillo 
(2015), relaxes this rational assumption slightly but seeing how strategies and outcomes 
are affected if one state inserts the possibility that they are “crazy”, or strategically 
irrational and might choose a strategy that lessens the probability of its own and perhaps its
opponents preferred outcomes. This can drastically affect the behavior and strategy of the 
other bargaining state, and in some cases can end in the “crazy” state getting a larger share 
of the agreement pie than it would have if it had acted normal. Put more succinctly, the 
“madman” model formally explains that it may in fact be rational to act “crazy”, or 
irrational, in certain situations (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). Considering that North Korea 
has often been dubbed irrational or crazy on many occasions, there is an obvious 
opportunity to compare whether their strategy actually aligns with the model’s 
expectations, thereby supporting the possibility North Korea is using its crazy reputation as 
a strategy to reach its nuclear goals. In order to capitalize on this opportunity, the 
theoretical and historical background the “madman” model is based on must be fully 
understood, along with the actual logic and approach of the model. Based one the model’s 
assumptions and ideal equilibriums, we can generate hypothesis on North Korea’s nuclear 
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strategy under Kim Jong-Un by studying the strategic interaction between North Korea 
and the United States or South Korea.
Theoretical Background and Assumptions
Before introducing the formal scholarship on crisis bargaining that helped form the 
“madman” theory, it is important to note that anecdotally the concept of a “madman” 
strategy as been discussed and utilized before by important historical figures. Acharya and 
Grillo (2015) note that former United States president Richard Nixon used the strategy 
during the Vietnam War in an attempt to coax better terms of an agreement from the North 
Vietnamese or Soviet Union. Additionally, they cite Iran’s former president Mahmoud 
Ahmedinejad as being suspected of trying to appear crazy for strategic gain along with 
other notable historical figures, including North Korean leaders (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). 
There is a clear historical precedent for the idea that country leaders in various time 
periods and scenarios thought it would behoove their chances of attaining what they 
wanted by acting crazy. Several scholarly works recognizing the “madman” strategy’s role 
in Nixon’s policies buttress the concept’s existence (Kaplan, 1991; Kimball, 2004; Lake, 
2011).
Theoretically, the model is based on formal crisis bargaining literature of states in 
non-cooperative games. The models in the crisis bargaining research paradigm generally 
focus on the conditions for war and peace, or when conflict is likely to arise in a situation 
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when states are involved in a dispute of interests. As discussed previously, Acharya and 
Grill (2015) draw from Powell (1987), Banks (1990), and Fearon (1995) in assuming that 
states will not go to war “when both parties are able to locate a Pareto superior negotiated 
settlement”, or in other words when the benefits of an agreement is do not make any state 
better off at the expense of making another participant worse off. Thus, the most efficient 
outcome of crisis bargaining situations is found in a settlement, and war is costly and 
inefficient (Fearon, 1995). Complications emerge when states have a reason to 
misrepresent information about themselves. In Robert Powell’s seminal work “Crisis 
Bargaining, Escalation and MAD” (1987), Powell demonstrates how game theoretic 
models on state conflict could be improved by introducing games of two-sided incomplete 
information, meaning the bargaining states do not know everything about the preferences 
and characteristics of their counterpart states. By creating asymmetries or gaps in 
information, new equilibriums, or outcomes based on the ideal strategy of each player, 
were found. This occurred even when assuming states were strategically rational, and 
subsequent works like Fearon (1995) explain conditions in which even strategically 
rationally states will go to war despite knowing the costs and inefficiencies of war. Schultz
(1999) demonstrated in an American politics context how politicians attempt to 
misrepresent their own characteristics as either “tough” or “lenient” as strategies to gain 
better payoffs from bargaining. This spark in research focusing on how misrepresenting 
behavioral characteristics about a bargaining actor affects equilibrium, or in other words 
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how uncertainty in player types in a game, is most relevantly represented in Abreu and 
Gul’s work on how players form reputations with various effects when bargaining (2000).
The Model:
The main ideal of the model is that even a strategically rational state has incentives 
to act crazy because other strategically rational states may give in to a crazy state’s 
outlandish bargain offers instead of risking escalation or conflict with a possibly crazed 
state (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). Additionally, even rational states will act crazy 
sometimes even if they are not if other states believe there is at least a chance of them 
being crazy. Thus, states pretend to be crazy at times depending on how crazy they are 
perceived to be and the payoffs they can expect from it. The determinants of how crazy a 
country acts are how much it is believe to be crazy prior to engagement by the other states, 
and two mechanisms that come in to play when two countries are guessing about the 
strategic rationality of the other state: reputation motive and defense motive (Acharya and 
Grillo, 2015). “The reputation motive describes the incentive of a country to pretend to be 
crazy in order to get a better settlement,” while the defensive motive is “the incentive of a 
country to make larger demands that risk escalation, to deter its adversary from pretending 
to be crazy too often” (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). The model uses game theory to design a 
game of interactions between two states in conflict over an issue, and based on the 
formulas and assumptions that make the rule of the game, shows unique predictions about 
when states are likely to act rational or not and the costs and benefits of using the 
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“madman” strategy in different scenarios. For simplicity’s sake, the assumptions and 
comparative statistics of the model will be outlined below with accompanying diagrams of 
the equations, algorithms, and mathematical propositions listed in the appendix.
Game theoretic models use game trees, or a map of a bargaining game that 
examines all possible moves by the players, to find the optimal strategies of each player 
and equilibrium outcomes. In the “madman model”, the following game tree is used a base 
for the rules and parameters of the game. 4 Acharya and Grillo (2015) describe the 
following scenario: “Countries A and B are engaged in a dispute over an issue. Country A 
moves first – the choice is between attacking country B and resolving the dispute 
peacefully. If country A attacks, then country B chooses between surrender and retaliate. If 
country B retaliates, then country A can either end the war with an armistice, or it can 
escalate the conflict by choosing total war.” The payoffs at each progressive node that does 
not end in peace decrease in value for each country, with an even steeper decrease in 
payoffs for each country if the outcome is total war, meaning that the more the dispute 
escalates the more costly it is to the countries and the less ideal for the attainment of their 
preferences. Acharya and Grillo (2015) outline how country A, the attacking country, 
prefers outcomes in the following order based on payoffs: surrender, peace, armistice, total 
war. Country B prefers: peace, armistice, surrender, total war (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). 
Acharya and Grillo (2015) demonstrate that under such conditions, the pareto outcome for 
                                                 
4 See Acharya and Grillo’s figure in Figure 1 of the Appendix
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each country, or “subgame perfect equilibrium” is peace, but under certain conditions 
states will not arrive at the most efficient outcome for both sides.
Acharya and Grillo (2015) use an example where country B’s belief that country A 
is strategically rational is 99%, which conversely denotes country B thinks there is 1% 
chance that country A could be crazy, or will always choose to attack instead of choosing 
piece and if country b retaliates they will always choose total war instead of armistice. 
Country A also thinks with 100% certainty that country B is strategically rationally, and 
has a very slight advantage in military power, which concerns the payoffs of an armistice 
outcome. Both countries know the other country’s prior beliefs about their strategic 
rationality, and both are the only one who really know if they are strategically rational or 
not respectively. Assuming that both countries are actually strategically rational, country A
will adjust its probability of choosing peace or attack and armistice or total war depending 
on the probability that country B thinks it is crazy and how strong its military is compared 
to country B. Similarly, country B will adjust whether it chooses retaliate or surrender 
based on attaining its highest preference outcome, the size of its military disadvantage, and 
the probability with which it thinks country A might be crazy. Acharya and Grillo (2015) 
calculate that in this example country A will thus attack just a bit more than 10% of the 
time, with country B retaliating with a probability of barely over 90%. This mean war is 
the outcome 10% of the time in equilibrium, and demonstrates how even strategically 
rational states can reach a total war without either wanting to and without it being the 
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efficient, rational option based on the possibility that one country thinks the other is crazy.
The outcomes can change based on whether country B acts strategically to choose between 
retaliate or surrender based on whether it thinks country A is sequentially rational, or in 
other words whether it think country A will choose armistice or not after attacking. This 
forms the basis for the logic of the model, where a country’s strategic choices change 
based on the prior probability of its opponent thinking it is crazy; the more likely country 
B thinks country A is crazy, the more likely country A is to attack (Acharya and Grillo, 
2015). Additionally, the stronger country A is militarily compared to country B, the less
likely it is to attack and the less likely country B is to retaliate, which lowers the chances 
of war (Acharya and Grillo, 2015).5 The “madman” model is then a full mapping of the 
equilibrium probabilities for the various outcomes in the game tree depending on the 
varying characteristics of the states, such as when the probability of a crazy state is higher, 
both states are believed to possibly be crazy, or there are different military imbalances.
In the actual “madman” model, the game tree is modified to include a round of 
bargaining where country B has the ability to make an offer to country A after country A 
attacks. This is significant because it gives both countries two nodes to find a resolution to 
the conflict that avoids the costliness of total war.6 As Acharya and Grillo (2015) explain:
                                                 
5 See Acharya and Grillo’s paper for more in-depth explanation; see Equation 1 in 
Appendix
6 See Acharya and Grillo’s figure in Figure 2 of the Appendix
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“Countries A and B are engaged in a dispute. Country A begins by deciding 
between peace and attack. In the case of peace, the countries receive payoffs (zA, 
zB). If country A attacks, then country B makes an offer xA ∈ X ≡ [0, 1], where 
xA is the payoff it is offering to country A and xB ≡ 1 − xA is the payoff that it is 
proposing for itself. Country A can either accept the offer or escalate the conflict 
by rejecting it. If it rejects, then country B either signs an armistice that leads to 
payoffs (yA, yB), or it chooses total war, which results in payoffs (0, 0). We 
assume that war is costly for both sides.”
Based on this game tree and the values labels for each country attached to action choice, 
the “madman” model splits possible state types into a crazy type and a strategic type that 
prefer certain actions over others. Acharya and Grillo basically make the assumption that 
the countries are in fact strategically rational, but both country A and B may mimic the 
crazy type in the face of its opponent’s probability of being crazy and in turn their 
opponent’s prior beliefs about them being crazy. From there, the “madman” model makes 
a few key assumptions about the rules of the game and the behavioral characteristics of 
states, and based on these assumptions makes various propositions about the equilibrium 
behavioral strategy profiles and associated belief system of the game (Acharya and Grillo, 
2015). These propositions detail how states will act based on the prior believed probability 
of their opponents being crazy and vice versa at each node of the game, determining 
67
unique equilibrium for countries A and B depending on their perceived probability of 
being crazy. Here are the main assumptions, and for the purpose of digestible reading, their 
overall meanings will be focused on rather than the mathematical algorithms that produced 
them.
Assumption 1: War is Costly7
Assumption 2: Crazy Types are Greedy8
These assumptions lay the foundation of the game in stating that the payoffs for 
country A and B start at peace and descend in value when reaching the payoffs from 
armistice, or in other words saying that with each round of escalation the payoffs get 
smaller as war becomes more costly. This means that the ideal, rational outcome for both 
strategic types of country A and B is peace, and that escalation and war should be avoided 
altogether. Also, even if country A attacks, both countries should be able to find pareto 
agreements that leave them better off than going to war. That being said, a crazy type in 
country A’s role, or the attacking country, prefers a payoff that is greater than the one it 
could from the peace option. Additionally, crazy type of country A is open for an 
agreement that is better for country B than armistice (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). On the 
flip side, crazy type of country B makes an offer to country A after attack that gives worse 
payoffs for country A than if it had chosen peace or the conflict ended in armistice 
                                                 
7 See Assumption 1 in Appendix (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
8 See Assumption 2 in Appendix (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
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(Acharya and Grillo, 2015). 9 It is also important to note that while country B can 
technically offer an endless number of offers after country A attacks, in essence it can 
offer three types: a greedy offer as described above that benefits country B more than 
peace would have and gives less payoff to country A, an intermediate offer that gives the 
payoffs of what a war ended in armistice would be, or a concessional offer that is what the 
crazy type of A would prefer (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). Ultimately these assumptions 
about the game and the characteristics of crazy types allow us to find equilibrium 
behavioral strategy profiles for each country at each node, or strategic option choice, of the 
game tree. The model determines the behavioral strategy profiles by calculating the 
probability of the strategic type of country A to (1) attack, (2) reject country B’s offer; and 
the probability of the strategic type of country B to (1) make any of the three types of 
offers, including the greedy type, (2) choose total war over armistice following a rejection 
of an offer by country A (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). The probability of country A and B 
being strategic or crazy are determined at each node using different equations using Bayes’ 
rule of probability based on prior belief and updating information (Acharya and Grillo, 
2015).10 The equilibrium behavioral strategy profiles of the game are broken up into five 
regions, with each region corresponding to the probability that country A and B is strategic 
or not. These descriptions of the equilibrium outcomes are stated in six propositions, where 
                                                 
9 See Equation 2 in Appendix (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
10 See Equations 3 and 4 in Appendix (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
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the parameters of the game and the characteristics of the countries are tweaked to explore 
new behavioral results. Here is a description of the equilibria in each of the five regions of 
behavioral strategy profiles in the first proposition, which is the ideal base form of the 
game’s equilibria11:
Proposition 1:
(i) If country B’s is believed prior to not likely be strategic, then the strategic type of 
country A will not attack because it likely will have to bargain with the crazy type 
of country B, making for worse outcomes (Acharya and Grillo, 2015).
(ii) If country B is believed to probably be strategic and country A is believed to likely 
be crazy, “then the strategic type of country A will attack for sure, and the 
strategic type of country B will try to settle the dispute early by making the 
concessional offer. This offer will be accepted by both the strategic and crazy 
types of country A” (Acharya and Grillo, 2015).
(iii) If country A is believed to likely be strategic, and country B is only moderately 
likely to be strategic but is not believed to be crazy, then the strategic type of 
country A attacks with a probability that is related to the prior beliefs of country B 
about its likelihood of being crazy. “If it attacks, then the strategic type of country 
B mixes between the concessional offer, which would be accepted for sure, and 
the greedy offer, that the crazy type of country B would make. Therefore, the 
                                                 
11 See Proposition 1 and Figure 3 in the Appendix (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
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strategic type of country B sometimes pretends to be crazy” (Acharya and Grillo, 
2015).
(iv) If country A is believed to be moderately strategic and country B is believed to 
likely be strategic, then country A attacks for sure and country B mixes between 
the concessional and greedy offer (Acharya and Grillo, 2015).
(v) When both country A and B are believed prior to likely be strategic, “then country 
A mixes between attacking and taking the peaceful outcome” based on country 
B’s belief on country A’s likelihood to be crazy; “and following an attack, country 
B mixes between the concessional, intermediate and greedy offers” Acharya and 
Grillo, 2015)
These ideal regions are unique equilibrium in a game of incomplete information 
because of two forces that work against one another and offset each other (Acharya and 
Grillo, 2015). These two forces, called the reputation motive and the defense motive,
render a strategic state indifferent about its action choices based on both countries knowing 
prior their beliefs about the other country being strategic, meaning that once one country 
knows the other country uses an equilibrium strategy, that country can select any choice 
with positive probability in their equilibrium strategy and end up with the same 
equilibrium payoff (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). The model shows that when uncertainty 
exists about two countries’ likelihood of being strategic, conflicts can arise even amongst 
strategic states that are hard to stop and may lead to war.
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The “madman” model goes on to detail how equilibrium behavior changes along 
the five regions when the parameters of the game are tweaked. In the second proposition, 
the model details how behavioral equilibrium is changed when the probability of being 
crazy changes for country A and B in the five regions (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). Here are 
the comparative statistics results on the “prevalence of crazy types” (Acharya and Grillo, 
2015):
Proposition 2:
(i) For country A and B, nothing changes if country B thinks country A’s probability 
of being strategic increases and vice versa until they move into a new region. 
Country A does not attack.
(ii) Nothing changes for country A and B with changed parameters within the region.
(iii) The more country A’s probability of being crazy goes down, the less likely 
country A is to attack in order to maintain its equilibrium strategy and the 
indifference by country B to all of the possible offers in what is called the 
reputation motive. When country A attacks, it must be infrequent enough for 
country B to believe that country A might really be crazy this time. Country A will 
not reject country B’s greedy offer. Conversely, when country B’s probability of 
being crazy goes down, its odds of making the concessional offer go down and its 
probability of making the greedy offer goes up as it increases mimicking of the 
crazy type to avoid being exploited; this is what is called the defense motive.
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(iv) When country A’s probability of being crazy decreases, country A always attacks 
as usual, but when presented with the greedy offer by country B they are more 
likely to reject the offer consistent with the reputation motive. If country B is more 
likely to be strategic, than it will become more likely to make the concessional 
offer as it becomes more appealing consistent with the reputation motive of 
country A.
(v) The more country A’s probability of being crazy goes down, the less likely 
country A is to attack in order to maintain its equilibrium strategy and the 
indifference by country B to all of the possible offers in what is called the 
reputation motive. When country A attacks, it must be infrequent enough for 
country B to believe that country A might really be crazy this time. Also, country 
A will reject country B’s greedy offer with a constant positive probability
consistent with the reputation motive. When country B’s likelihood of being 
strategic goes up, it increases its probability of choosing the intermediate or greedy 
offer and decreases its chances of choosing the concessional offer consistent with 
the defense motive.12
Another important proposition details how equilibrium strategy profile changes 
depending on how greedy the states are, or how aggressive they are as crazy types 
(Acharya and Grillo, 2015). This can be summed fairly simply: the more aggressive the 
                                                 
12 See Proposition 2 in the Appendix (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
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crazy type of country A or B is, or in other words how much they demand for in their 
greedy offers in the bargaining/offer node, the more the defense motive kicks in and the 
responding country’s likelihood to mimic a crazy type goes up. The more concessional the 
offer country A seeks from country B, the less likely country B makes the offer. The more 
greedy the offer by country B, the more likely country A is to reject it so as not be 
exploited.13
The “madman” model also explicates how equilibrium changes when military 
advantages are added to one country versus the other.14 This is relevant because in the 
game, an armistice end to a war has its payoffs determined by the balance of military 
strength between country A and country B. The following is what occurs to the five 
regions in the first proposition on the basic strategic equilibria when the military strength 
of country A increases (Acharya and Grillo, 2015):
Proposition 4:
(i) Nothing changes for country A or country B when country A’s military strength 
increases in terms of country A’s willingness to attack. Country A would still 
rather not negotiate with the crazy type of country B.
(ii) Nothing changes for country A or country B when country A’s military strength 
increases in terms of country A’s willingness to attack. Country A was always 
                                                 
13 See Proposition 3 in the Appendix (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
14 See Assumption 3 and Proposition 4 in the Appendix (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
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going to attack country B regardless, and country B was going to make the 
concessional offer regardless. 
(iii) As country A’s military advantage increases, its likelihood of attacking increases 
as it gets higher payoffs from an armistice agreement. Conversely for country B, it 
makes the greedy offer less likely as country A’s military advantage goes up since 
its payoffs from acting crazy decrease. However, the defense motive makes it 
ambiguous as to whether country B will make the concessional offer more often so 
as to not be exploited. Similarly, country A may increase or decrease its likelihood 
of rejecting a greedy offer from country B due to the defense motive’s tension 
with increased payoffs of an agreement. 
(iv) Nothing changes for country A or country B when country A’s military strength 
increases in terms of country A’s willingness to attack. Country A was always 
going to attack country B regardless. Conversely for country B, it makes the 
greedy offer less likely as country A’s military advantage goes up since its payoffs 
from acting crazy decrease. However, the defense motive makes it ambiguous as 
to whether country B will make the concessional offer more often so as to not be 
exploited. Similarly, country A may increase or decrease its likelihood of rejecting 
a greedy offer from country B due to the defense motive’s tension with increased 
payoffs of an agreement.
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(v) As country A’s military advantage increases, its likelihood of attacking increases 
as it gets higher payoffs from an armistice agreement. Conversely for country B, it 
makes the greedy offer less likely as country A’s military advantage goes up since 
its payoffs from acting crazy decrease. However, the defense motive makes it 
likely that country B will offer the intermediate offer. Similarly, country A may 
increase or decrease its likelihood of rejecting a greedy offer from country B due 
to the defense motive’s tension with increased payoffs of an agreement.
Finally, the last proposition that will be covered deals with the payoffs that each 
country can expect before the start of the game depending on the region. This is important 
for dealing with why states may choose to initiate a conflict and what they expect out of it, 
regardless of what the actual results may be. Based on the foundational assumptions 1 and 
2 listed above, Acharya and Grillo (2015) determined how country A and B have higher or 
lower payoffs for each region, noting that country A has higher ex-ante payoffs than the 
peaceful option in regions two and four while country B has always expectations slightly 
less than the peace option.15 The fifth proposition details how country A and B expect their 
payoffs to change based on changes to prior beliefs about their likelihood of being the 
strategic type:16
Proposition 5:
                                                 
15 See Equation 5 and 6 in the Appendix (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
16 See Proposition 5 in the Appendix (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
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(i) The more country A is likely to be crazy, the worse payoff country B can expect as 
it struggles to deal with the possibility of the crazy type. The more likely country 
A is to be strategic, the better it is for country B and its payoffs while the worse it 
gets for country A.
(ii) The more country B is likely to be crazy, the worse payoff country A can expect as 
it struggles with dealing with the possibility of the crazy type. The more likely 
country B is to be strategic, the better it is for country A and its payoffs while the 
worse it gets for country B.
(iii) The more country A is likely to be crazy, the worse payoff country B can expect as 
it struggles to deal with the possibility of the crazy type. The more likely country 
A is to be strategic, the better it is for country B and its payoffs while the worse it 
gets for country A.
(iv) The more country B is likely to be crazy, the worse payoff country A can expect as 
it struggles with dealing with the possibility of the crazy type. The more likely 
country B is to be strategic, the better it is for country A and its payoffs while the 
worse it gets for country B.
(v) The more country A is likely to be crazy, the worse payoff country B can expect as 
it struggles to deal with the possibility of the crazy type. The more likely country 
A is to be strategic, the better it is for country B and its payoffs while the worse it 
gets for country A.
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There is one final proposition dealing with ex-ante payoffs based on the 
aggressiveness of crazy types, but the proposition is ambiguous based on the competing 
reputation and defensive motives (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). With all of these iterations 
considered, we can move to see how the model would predict interactions between North 
Korea and its rivals to unfold based on its interactions with other rival states. 
Hypothesis Set for the “Madman” Model
The “madman” model points us to North Korea and its rivals’ perceptions of thert 
own and the opponent’s likelihood to be “crazy” as the main independent variables for its 
choice of nuclear strategies. It treats North Korea’s goal of seeking nuclear weapons as a 
given, whereas its opponents prefer North Korea does not have nuclear weapons 
capabilities, creating a conflict of interests. Since North Korea’s opponents are the ones 
with the perceived issue of stopping North Korean nuclear weapons and could unilaterally 
choose the peaceful option, they are most likely to play the role of country A, the attacker, 
while North Korea plays the role of country B, the defender. However, North Korea can 
occasionally play the role of country A considering it disagrees on the issue of sanctions, 
lack of recognition, or other interests. These can be weighted in favor of one side versus 
the other in the model (Acharya and Grillo, 2015). This is an interesting part of the 
model’s application, as North Korea is generally presumed to be responding to an attack 
from another country in this analysis, not unlike how Victor Cha’s structural theory 
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explains North Korea’s response to an unfriendly status quo of power distribution. For the 
same of simplicity in analysis, interactions between the United States and North Korea will 
be the main focus considering that both are the key players in any denuclearization
agreement or conflict. There is reason to believe that North Korea is mainly focused on the 
United States in resolution of the conflict of interest considering the prestige of the nation 
and its influence in the region over other states like South Korea (Hymans, 2008). Thus, if 
we can establish qualitatively a reasonable threshold for prior belief that North Korea 
might by crazy by the United States, and vice versa, we can generate hypotheses on each
of the four types of nuclear strategies as a part of an explanation of the equilibrium 
strategies found in proposition 1 above.
For this model to work, we must assume that a strategically rational North Korea 
would like to fulfill its nuclear weapons goal as efficiently as possible, and thus would use 
fast nuclear strategy as the status quo when possible.
Hypothesis Set 1: When the United States is Likely to Be Strategic (Country A), and North 
Korea is Moderately Likely to be Strategic (Country B) – (Region 3)
H1: Peace indicates that North Korea is on its preferred highest payoff strategy, 
which is the fast nuclear strategy.
H2: North Korea will use fast but slow-signaling nuclear strategy after the United 
States attacks when conveying an offer to the United States. This captures the idea that 
North Korea changes its status quo when it feels it has been attacked and it warrants a 
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response with an offer to cease escalation at the highest payoff point. North Korea is 
expected to mix between a greedy and concessional offer, where a strategic United States 
will accept the latter and depending on the reputation or defensive motive accept or reject 
the former, but rejection and armistice has positive probability. 
H3: North Korea will employ a slow strategy when the United States has accepted 
its concessional offer. This represents the payoffs for the countries depending on the offer 
made by North Korea.
H4: North Korea will employ a fast nuclear strategy when the United States has 
agreed to a greedy offer from North Korea or rejected it. This implies North Korea can get 
its next highest payoff from peace and at a worse position for the United States if accepted, 
or use fast nuclear strategy with worse payoffs at armistice.
Hypothesis Set 2: When the United States is Likely to be Strategic (Country A), and North 
Korea is Likely to be Strategic (Country B) – (Region 5)
H1: North Korea will use fast nuclear strategy as the status quo
H2: North Korea will use a fast but slow-signaling nuclear strategy after being 
attacked by the United States and making an offer.
H3: North Korea will use a slow nuclear strategy when offering an intermediate 
offer and the United States accepts.
H4: North Korea will use a slow nuclear strategy when it offers the concessional 
offer and the United States accepts.
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H5: North Korea will use a fast nuclear strategy when it offers the greedy offer to 
the United States and it rejects. If the United States accepts the greedy offer, North Korea 
will be use fast but slow-signaling nuclear strategy with higher payoffs than armistice. If 
the United States rejects, North Korea will continue fast nuclear strategy but at the lower
payoff of armistice.
Hypothesis Set 3: When North Korea is Likely to be Moderately Strategic (Country A) and 
the United States is Likely to be Strategic (Country B) – (Region 4)
H1: North Korea will employ slow but fast-signaling strategy when launching an 
attack as a limited form of force.
H2: North Korea will employ a slow nuclear strategy if it accepts the greedy offer 
of the United States.
H3: North Korea will employ a fast nuclear strategy if it accepts the concessional 
offer from the United States.
H4: North Korea will employ a fast nuclear strategy if it rejects the offer from the 
United States.
These two sets of hypotheses are a reflection of the logical conditions under which the 
United States and North Korea would bargain over a conflict in a crisis-bargaining 
situation. The other regions in the model beyond three and five are irrelevant, as they are 
not feasible calculations of how North Korea and the United States view their counterpart 
and their propensity to be a crazy type. Based on qualitative evidence, we can establish for 
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each period of transition the region of equilibrium North Korea and the United States 
correspond to. Next, following the hypotheses, we should assume changes from the status 
quo of fast nuclear strategy indicates that North Korea feels it has been attacked and is 
responding. We can then analyze the different nodes of the game tree and how this would 
affect North Korea’s nuclear strategy. In short, this explanation should be able to tell us if 
North Korea and the United States are performing as the equilibrium strategy profiles 
would expect.
Application to the Case
Transition 1: Fast but Slow-Signaling to Slow, February 29th, 2012
There are several instances that could constitute what North Korea would deem an 
attack by the United States leading up to the Leap Day Agreement. The joint military 
exercises by the US-ROK military alliance forces drew the ire of North Korea, who 
threatened to turn Seoul into a sea of fire if the proceedings were not cancelled (Davenport, 
2017). Additionally, the U.S. announced new bans on North Korean imports that could 
benefit nuclear weapons development, and perhaps most significantly a United States 
warship confronted and forced the reverse course of a North Korean trade ship near China 
(Davenport, 2017). Although there is no set threshold for an attack, it is reasonable to 
argue that the United States was using force to unilaterally impose its interest of 
denuclearizing North Korea and thus starting the first section of the game node. In testing 
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the “madman” model, we first need to reasonably establish which region of equilibrium 
the United States and North Korea correspond to based on their perceptions of the other 
country and their likelihood of being a “crazy” type.
Harvey Simon (2011) indicated that North Korea might be using the “madman” 
strategy, and US reports show that not much is known about North Korea’s leadership 
(Chanlett-Avery, 2016). It is reasonable to assume that the United States and North Korea 
are represented somewhere in region three, four, or five of the “madman” model, where 
the United States is likely to be strategic and North Korea is either moderately likely or 
likely to be strategic as well. The alternative regions would imply that the United States is 
unlikely to be strategic, which is intuitively not the reputation it holds in the international 
community, or that North Korea is likely to be crazy, in which case the United States 
would never risk provoking North Korea due to their belief that North Korea will demand 
too much or go to total war irrationally. Thus, North Korea must be believed to be 
moderately likely or likely to be strategically rational by the United States to provoke them, 
and that North Korea is at least moderately strategic otherwise it would always attack the 
United States. Based on the fact that Kim Jong-Un had just recently been declared the new 
leader with virtually no high-level diplomatic experience negotiating with the United 
States, it seems more likely that the United States would designate North Korea as 
moderately likely to be rational, and thus we should refer to hypothesis set one in 
examining the first transition (Chanlett-Avery, 2016).
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Prior to February 29th, 2012, North Korea displayed a fast but slow-signaling 
nuclear strategy as it negotiated bilaterally with the United States while it simultaneously 
introduced and consolidated Kim Jong-Un’s rise to leadership. North Korea had in 2011 
expressed an interest in returning to the negotiating table about denuclearization after 
developing its uranium enrichment facilities and increased tensions with South Korea 
following shelling of the South Korean Yeonpyeong island in 2010 (Davenport, 2017). 
This coincided with the death of Kim Jong-Il, the former leader of North Korea, and the 
official announcement of Kim Jong-Un as the new supreme leader of the country in late 
2011 (Davenport, 2017). Shortly after, North Korea and the United States announced their 
Leap Day Agreement, marking the transition into a period of slow North Korean nuclear 
strategy. For a brief period, North Korea seemed to agree to slow its nuclear weapons 
development with its moratorium and adhere to the deal faithfully. This change in nuclear 
strategy should thus indicate H2 and H3 in the first hypothesis set, where North Korea 
goes from offering a deal to the United States in response to the attack to the aftermath of 
the United States accepting their concessional offer.
The evidence seems to support the equilibrium behavior of North Korea having 
initially made a concessional offer to the United States. According to the model, a 
moderately strategic North Korea will choose between a concessional and a greedy offer 
based on the United States’ probability of being strategic. Using the comparative statistics 
of the model, the military advantage and the low likelihood of the United States being a 
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crazy type decrease the chances of North Korea extending the greedy offer. Thus, the 
United States as either the strategic type or the crazy type accepted North Korea’s 
concessional offer. The terms of the agreement seem to highly favor the United States 
considering that North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear facility, allow outside inspectors 
into the country, and stop nuclear-related testing in exchange for a couple of hundred 
thousand tons of food aid (Davenport, 2017). This aligns with the equilibrium strategy 
profiles of the two countries and supports the idea that the game parameters seem to co-
vary quite closely to the real situation.
Transition 2: Slow to Slow but Fast-Signaling, March 16th, 2012
The threat by North Korea to launch a weather satellite in honor of Kim Il-Sung 
marks the transition from slow to slow but fast-signaling nuclear strategy. This would 
indicate that North Korea was the aggressor acting as country A; using a threat of limited 
force to attack the United States over the conflicted interest of denuclearizing the peninsula. 
As discussed, for North Korea to attack the United States it must be operating within 
region four or five, otherwise North Korea would have been prone to more attacks on the 
United States to try and reap outlandish rewards from their crazy behavior.
The United States responded by sending a greedy offer, in which North Korea’s 
payoff was much less than armistice or concessional offer. The equilibrium of the game 
indicates that country B will mix between the concessional and greedy offer, and that 
armistice is a positive probable outcome. Based on the comparative statistics of North 
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Korea likely being seen as less likely to be crazy than in the past having agreed to the Leap 
Day Agreement, the incentive for the United States to make the greedy offer have gone up 
in line with H1 from Hypothesis Set 3.
Transition 3: Slow but Fast-Signaling to Fast, April 12th, 2012
The actual launch of the satellite confirms that North Korea switched to a fast 
nuclear strategy, and also continues the equilibrium story in Hypothesis Set 3 with its 
predictions of armistice probability for region four. H4 indicates that North Korea will 
pursue a fast nuclear strategy when rejecting the greedy offer by the United States. This 
would support the expectation that North Korea was operating under a defense motive, 
where the North Korea is incentivized by the military strength of the United States and the 
likely strategic nature of the United States to not allow itself to be exploited by mimicking 
a crazy type. Although North Korea could not get the concessions it wanted, which was 
likely fast nuclear strategy and other benefits from the deal, the armistice arrangement 
provides an equilibrium outcome in which North Korea is able to pursue fast nuclear 
strategy but at the cost of the United States reenacting its sanctions and other forms of 
costs on them while the United States has the outcome of an armistice by not escalating the 
issue further to total war.
Transition 4: Fast to Fast but Slow-Signaling, January 10th, 2015
After three years of nuclear behavior consistent with a fast nuclear strategy, such 
as nuclear device tests and missile testing designed to increase North Korea’s missile range 
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and ability to carry nuclear weapon payloads, North Korea conveys a rare public offer to 
suspend its planned fourth nuclear test in exchange for the cancellation of the annual US-
ROK joint military exercises that have bothered North Korea in the past (Davenport, 2017). 
This public announcement through its official news agency, which claims North Korea 
offered the United States, was legitimate enough to illicit a rejection by the United States’ 
State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki, claiming that the nuclear issue and the military 
drills were separate issues (Davenport, 2017). Nonetheless, this indicates a gesture or offer 
with real audience costs that put North Korea’s prestige on the line, since they would be 
complied to agree or suffer reputation and possibly conflict costs if the United States had 
agreed and North Korea rescinded its offer. Thus, North Korea suddenly changed from fast 
to fast but slow-signaling strategy, dependent on negotiations with the United States. 
According to the model, we should look for an attack that triggered the offer by North 
Korea and qualitative evidence to support the identification of the United States and North 
Korea in a particular equilibrium region. 
In early January right before the offer to the United States, North Korea had its 
sanctions expanded by the US as they continued to crack down on missile and nuclear-
related government activity (Davenport, 2017). The timing of the sanctions and the 
damage of the sanctions intended for North Korea’s nuclear weapons development seem to 
show that North Korea interpreted this as an attack of limited force over their conflicting 
87
interests on the possession of nuclear weapons. Thus, North Korea extended an offer to the
United States consistent with the game tree.
Additionally, there is reason to believe that the United States had updated its prior 
beliefs on North Korea to push it into the region five equilibrium, which details the 
behavioral profiles of two likely strategic countries. The decrease in North Korean 
attempts to engage with the United States over the roughly three year span since the Leap 
Day Agreement indicate that North Korea was adjusting its exogenous drop in likelihood 
of being crazy by decreasing the amount of attacks it made as a manifestation of the 
reputation motive. This is done in order to the keep the United States indifferent on its 
strategic choices based on the probability that North Korea might be irrational. Likewise, 
the United States waited as well to attack considering its own prior knowledge that North 
Korea thinks of the United States as a likely strategic country. Thus, H2 and its 
expectations in the second hypothesis set seems to be congruent with the dependent 
variable in this transition.
Transition 5: Fast but Slow-Signaling to Fast, February 7th 2015
The return to a full, fast nuclear strategy was highlighted by the costly signal of 
launching an anti-ship missile with the leader Kim Jong-Un reported as present for the test 
(Davenport, 2017). Kim Jong-Un personally being present for an aggressive military test, 
open to the world, indicates North Korea’s foreign policy plan to continue its pursuit of 
nuclear weapons with no intentions of backing or slowing down based on the costs this 
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would do to the national and personal image of North Korea and Kim Jong-Un 
respectively. Accordingly with transition four, we assume that this stage of the bargaining 
game reflects the United States’ strategic choice and North Korea’s response, showing 
equilibrium behavior for region five of the model.
The offer made by North Korea to the United States, in which they offered to 
suspend testing of nuclear weapons and missiles in exchange for the cancellation of the 
joint military exercise with South Korea, was rejected by the United States on the grounds 
that the two issues were not related (Davenport, 2017). Regarding the terms of the deal and 
the payoffs in the game tree, North Korea had clearly made a concessional offer based on 
the slowing down of their entire nuclear weapons testing in exchange for the cancellation 
of a military display. This was definitely above the armistice level of payoffs considering 
that conflict would not have forced North Korea to commit to that outcome. The reason for 
the United States’ rejection can be explained through the defense motive, where despite 
North Korea’s concessional offer, the high probability of the US being a strategic type in 
North Korea’s eyes extends the incentive for the US to endogenously mimic crazy type 
behavior at this stage of the game to ensure North Korea doesn’t exploit them by 
pretending to be crazy themselves. The United States has to keep North Korea indifferent 
to their strategy choices in equilibrium based on the chance that the United States might 
actually go to suboptimal outcomes irrationally.
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As expected in equilibrium, or in H5 of hypothesis set two, North Korea chooses 
armistice in region five with positive probability by refusing to escalate the issue further 
after the rejection and living with the payoff of pursuing nuclear weapons at full pace 
despite the costs of the exchange inhibited upon them by the United States.
Transition 6: Fast to Fast but Slow-Signaling, July 6th, 2016
On July 6th, 2016, a high-level North Korean government spokesman released a 
statement declaring North Korea’s openness to resume denuclearization talks provided 
conditions were met on the agreed definition of denuclearization and the ceasing of 
threatening behavior between countries (Carlin, 2016). This message constitutes a costly 
signal wherein North Korea would suffer audience costs if it backed down from its 
willingness to cooperate, yet the United States responded by adding Kim Jong-Un and 
other North Korean leaders to its designations of human rights abuses (Carlin, 2016). This 
would indicate that North Korea perceived an attack, and that North Korea and the United 
States are adhering to equilibrium outcomes based on their prior beliefs about the other 
country possibly being crazy.
At this point, there is mounting evidence to assume that North Korea and the
United States consider each other likely strategic states. Kim and Cohen (2017) and 
Pollack (2017) outline how the United States has adapted its approach to North Korea with 
the expectation that North Korea is not far from deterrence and using their nuclear strategy 
wisely to achieve their goals. This would situate North Korea and the United States within 
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region five of the equilibrium profiles, but within the region the United States also seems 
to be making an effort to change North Korea’s prior beliefs about the chance the United 
States will stop at nothing, including total war. The advocating of China and the use of the 
UN Security Council to condemn North Korean nuclear weapons development, along with 
the attack of increased sanctions and designations of human rights abuses on Kim Jong-Un 
personally constitute and attack (Davenport, 2017).
Transition 7: Fast but Slow-Signaling to Fast, August 3rd, 2016
North Korea returned to completely fast nuclear strategy through the costly 
signaling of arms build up, or a message through missile testing in August of 2016. This 
indicated North Korea was once again unwilling to back down on its nuclear ambitions 
and was followed by a slew of submarine-based missile tests, ICBM tests, and a fifth 
nuclear test (Davenport, 2017). The return to fast nuclear strategy is explained in the 
model’s second hypothesis set H5, where North Korea’s strategic choices situated within 
an equilibrium that can be explained through comparative statistics.
The successful testing of SLBM’s, ICBM’s, and a nuclear device indicate North 
Korea is closes than ever to second-strike capability and viable preemptive/preventive 
action through nuclear means (Armstrong, 2017; Kim and Cohen, 2017; Pollack, 2017). 
While the THAAD system was implemented in South Korea, North Korea has estimated 
strike range of up to Los Angeles, Denver, and Chicago (Davenport, 2017; Kim and Cohen, 
2017). The improvements in nuclear capabilities indicate a relative improvement in 
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military strength that is used to calculate the costs of armistice between the United States 
and North Korea. Additionally, considering that the United States’ prior beliefs about 
North Korea being strategic were going up, North Korea has a defense motive incentive to 
mimic the crazy type in order to stop exploitation from the United States when they attack. 
This explains why North Korea chose a greedy deal to offer the United States on 
denuclearization, where if denuclearization were to occur it would occur it would happen 
on North Korea’s terms and by their definition (Carlin, 2016). These conditions are not 
ideal for the surplus the United States prefers, and they have a reputation motive to reject 
greedy offers to promote the idea that they cannot be considered 100% rational. In the end, 
this lead to the equilibrium outcome of armistice, where North Korea pursues fast nuclear 
strategy short of real war and enjoys significantly costlier payoffs than if an early 
agreement had been made.
Analysis:
Overall, the “madman” model compelling explains how even strategically rational 
states must mimic crazy behavior if there is even a small chance that their opposing 
country think they are irrational. It makes sense sometimes to act as if you are crazy, 
otherwise another strategic state will use its reputation for craziness to exploit you. 
Likewise, a country can try to leverage the uncertainty about their true intentions to get 
higher payoffs in a conflict. The model gives a roadmap to when and why states might 
change their nuclear strategies, and when applied to North Korea, the ideal regions of 
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equilibrium offer innovative explanations. The weakness in the approach used in the study 
is that it uses a congruence test to see whether the evidence matches the expectations of the 
model without eliminating the possibilities of other independent variables being 
responsible. In other words, it is hardly causality. Additionally, the game tree and the 
parameters might need to be adjusted for the North Korean case to see how subsequent 
interactions between the states affects their likeliness of acting crazy in the future. For 
instance, it is possible that North Korea initially made a concessional offer as part of the 
bargain on the Leap Day Agreement, but shortly after mixed in a greedy offer, which could 
indicate multiple bargaining opportunities or perhaps that the two should be treated as one 
offer. This approach also qualitatively determined the regions of equilibrium and various 
comparative statistics that were applied to explain North Korean nuclear strategy; this is 
dangerously ad-hoc but nonetheless the results seem intuitive and based on compelling 
anecdotal evidence from US Congressional Reports and scholars (Chanlett-Avery, 2016; 
Kim and Cohen, 2017; Pollack, 2017). It seems that based on these findings that North 
Korea actively leverages its reputation of possibly being crazy to try to find optimal 
strategic outcomes. As time has gone on, the United States has treated North Korea more 
and more like a rational, strategic state with a low chance of being actually irrational, and 
hence the lack of engagement with North Korea. North Korea also seems to interpret 
sanctions and acts against its nuclear weapons developments as threats considering the 
immediacy with which North Korea offers some form of bargaining to the United States 
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following these acts. For its part, the United States seems to be intent on its own reputation 
and defense motives to maintain the prospect that North Korea must respect they may not 
be completely rational, and if push came to shove there are scenarios where the United 
States would take suboptimal outcomes like total war. All in all, it seems viewing North 
Korean nuclear strategy as a part of the bargaining dynamics between them and the United 
States and other rivals is a fruitful research program.
Conclusion:
This paper was an attempt to explain the variance in North Korean nuclear strategy 
displayed under the rule of Kim Jong-Un. Specifically, this paper argued that we can think 
about North Korean nuclear strategy as either going fast or slow, and that part of its 
strategy is dependent on the actions of other actors. Additionally, two theoretical models 
that had very different analytical focuses were used to compare their effectiveness in 
answering the question of how North Korea tries to achieve its nuclear goals. The coercive 
bargaining model represents a structural neorealist approach with a twist of prospect 
theory, and the “madman” theory represents a crisis-bargaining approach with a basis in 
game theory. Both models provide compelling cases to show that North Korea is in fact 
rational, and that depending on the circumstances, it is sometimes rational to act irrational 
even, or to change course in your nuclear strategy in unexpected ways.
94
The coercive bargaining model hypothesized that North Korea would change its 
nuclear strategy based on whether it found itself in a winning or losing situation from its 
current status quo in the international system. Depending on whether it was winning or 
losing, North Korea would favorably view fast or slow nuclear strategy, and possibly 
hedge depending on the risks involved. Based on this study, it seems very likely that North 
Korea filters its nuclear strategy options to some degree because of the anarchic pressures 
placed on it by the power distribution of the international system. It also seems reasonable 
to think that North Korea bases its decision-making around risk propensities. The structure 
of North Korea’s environment alone; however, cannot fully explain why North Korea 
agreed to the Leap Day Agreement at such a low payoff and subsequently broke from the 
deal almost immediately after agreeing to it. The “madman” theory presented unique 
equilibrium strategic profiles of countries with different properties that bargained with 
each other over a conflicted issue. The key to the model was the prior beliefs of each 
country about how likely they thought another country was rational or not. The model 
demonstrates that even a small chance of a country being crazy changes how strategically 
rational countries bargain, and that there are a lot of circumstances where a rational state 
try to act crazy even when they are not to get higher payoffs from their bargains. The 
model was originally used to determine when and why war will broke out when better 
options are available, but using the positive probabilities of the equilibriums, we can also 
explain how North Korea goes back and forth with the United States about its nuclear 
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weapons and adjusts its strategy accordingly to try and reach the best outcome. North 
Korea had a reputation for being moderately likely to be crazy in the eyes of the United 
States, while the United States was considered very likely to be strategically rational. This 
explains why North Korea and the United States entered an agreement and broke from it 
early in Kim Jong-Un’s regime by performing close to equilibrium expectations. 
Comparative statistics showed how changes in the way the US viewed North Korea’s 
rationality changed the strategies and outcomes of their bargains.
The study had significant limitations, most notably the use of a congruence test 
approach. By only comparing the hypotheses of each model with the dependent variable to 
see if the independent variable co-varied, we were able to reasonably assume that there is 
something to it, but without actually tracing the process in which North Korea chooses its 
nuclear strategy we cannot be confident in any claims. Unfortunately, unless more access 
to North Korea is opened, case study approaches like this one will be severely limited. 
Additionally, attempts to modify the original theoretical models to produce testable 
hypotheses may have stretched the models beyond their intent. For the “madman” model, a 
more comprehensive game theoretic approach that more systematically tests case studies 
against equilibrium expectations could fruitfully improve this paper, along with a 
modification of the game tree to include more bargaining opportunities. The findings of 
the paper indicate that Victor Cha’s original theory still has utility in the right contexts, 
and that the “madman” theory deserves far more research in uncovering the strategic ways 
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in which actors try to misrepresent information about themselves for their own purposes 
and whether its effective or not.
For future implications, the coercive bargaining model would point to North 
Korea’s improving nuclear weapons program as a basis for finding themselves in a domain 
of gains, and this is perhaps coming to the best time to engage North Korea diplomatically. 
The “madman” model has exciting research opportunities in examining how President 
Trump may be shifting North Korea’s perceptions about the United States’ rationality, and 
what effects this might have on equilibrium strategies and outcomes. Finally, studies on 
nuclear behavior can only go so far without incorporating the why question. While it 
provides clean analytical divisions to study just the how, the reasons why a country wants 
a nuclear weapons can greatly influence their decision-making and strategy on how to get 
them. These models mostly leave these factors unexplored, and future research could 
benefit from acknowledging the complexity of decision-making and strategy with the 
origin of nuclear preferences.
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Speed Fast Fast Slow Slow
Signaling Fast Slow Fast Slow
Table 2: History of North Korean Nuclear Strategy Transitions from 2011-2017



















































Table 3: How Do States Frame the Status Quo? *modified from original model





























Figure 1: Base Game Tree from Acharya and Grillo (2015)
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Figure 2: “Madman” Model Game Tree
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Figure 3: Figure of Proposition 1 and Equilibrium of Five Regions (Acharya and 
Grillo, 2015)
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Equation 1: Equilibrium Probability of War from Acharya and Grillo (2015)
Equation 2: Assumptions 1 & 2 Combined (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
1 > rA > yA > sA > 0
Equation 3: Country B’s Updated Belief that Country A is Strategic Following 
Attack (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
Equation 4: Country A’s Updated Belief that Country B is Strategic Following an 
Offer (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
Equation 5: Country A’s Ex-Ante Expected Payoffs
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Equation 6: Country B’s Ex-Ante Expected Payoffs
Assumption 1: War is Costly (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
(i) zA > yA > 0, (ii) zB > yB > 0, and (iii) zA + zB > 1 > yA + yB.
Assumption 2: Crazy Types are Greedy (Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
(i) 1 − yB > rA > zA and (ii) min{1 − zB, yA} > sA > 0.
Assumption 3: Payoff Profiles where Country A is Stronger than Country B 
(Acharya and Grillo, 2015)
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Proposition 1: Equilibria of the Game for the Five Behavioral Strategic Profile 
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정책 입안자들과 정치학자들은 북한이 핵무기 국가가 되려고 한다고 동의하지만, 
북한이 그 목표를 실현시키려고 하는 방법에 대해서는 의견이 분분하다. 과거 수
십년동안, 북한은 예상치 못하게, 또는 겉보기에는 비이성적인 방법으로 핵무기를
달성하는 것을 종종 늦추거나 가속화 시켰다. 북한의 다양한 핵무기 전략을
설명하는 것은 김정은의 집권 이후, 그가 매일 대륙간, 제 2 격의 핵무기 능력을
성장시키면서 더욱 더 중요해졌다. 이러한 연구 주제에 대한 몇몇 이론적 접근을
평가하기 위해, 본 연구는 북한의 핵전략에 적용되는 두 가지 이론적 모델의
설명력을 검토하고 비교하고자 한다: Victor Cha 에 의해 고안된 강압적 거래
모델과 Avidit Acharya 과 Edoardo Grillo 에 의해 고안된 "매드맨" 모델이다. 
권력 이행 이론과 전망 이론에 기반한 강압적 거래 모델은, 북한의 위험한 핵전략
선택 수용을 북한의 국제 사회에서의 자신의 위치에 대한 인식을 통해 합리화한다. 
양쪽의 불완전한 정보 게임 이론에 기반한 "매드맨" 모델은, 그 자신을 위해 더 큰
부당 전략적 결과에 대해 북한이 "미치게 행동"하는 논리를 극찬한다. 일치성
검사가 모델들의 예측이 북한의 신속한 것에서부터 느린것까지, 또는 그
반대이거나, 2011 년부터 2017 년까지의 핵전략에서의 이행과 서로 달라지는지
사용되었다.
